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Long-Run Eﬀects of Social
Security Reform Proposals on
Lifetime Progressivity
Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton,
and Thomas Glass
5.1 Introduction
Most observers agree that the U.S. Social Security system must be re-
formed. Although the original “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) system was con-
verted to a partially funded system in 1983, promised future beneﬁts still
exceedexpected future taxes—especially by the time the baby boom popu-
lation bulge is ﬁnished retiring. When converted into 1995 dollars, the “in-
termediate” projected deﬁcit for the year 2075 is $480 billion, or just less
than 4 percent of projected gross domestic product (GDP; U.S. Social
Security Administration 1998).
In addition to serving as a mandatory retirement saving program, Social
Security is a program of social insurance with many redistributive ele-
ments. The program redistributes income not only from current working
generations to the retired, but also between families of a given generation
in diﬀerent circumstances. The beneﬁts formula is highly progressive in
that it provides a greater replacement rate for workers with lower lifetime
earnings. Beneﬁts well in excess of taxes paid are also provided to spouses
whod on ot work, to survivors of deceased workers, and to women in gen-
eral (because they tend to live longer than men). Any reform will alter
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149redistribution under the program, and many proposals give careful consid-
eration to this issue. In general, the current system is considered to be
progressive, and most proposals seek to maintain or enhance that degree
of progressivity.
In this chapter, we estimate the implied changes to the progressivity of
the current system from four speciﬁc reform proposals. We focus on the
retirement portion of the program and the redistribution between the rich
and poor of a given generation, giving special attention to how we classify
economic well-being. We take a steady-state approach in that we assume
people worka nd retire under a given system. Thus, we do not address
intergenerational redistribution or the issue of transition costs from the
present system to any given new system. To deﬁne who is richo rp oor, we
use an estimate of lifetime potential income—the present value of the total
value of one’s time. We also pool the resources of husbands and wives.
A spouse of a high earner who chooses to stay at home is therefore not
misclassiﬁed as “poor” under our methodology. We use a large data set of
almost 2,000 individuals and classify them into ﬁve lifetime income
groups. We calculate the present value of the Social Security taxes paid
and beneﬁts received for each individual. The diﬀerence is divided by life-
time potential income to provide a lifetime “net tax rate.” If this net tax
rate rises across the ﬁve income groups, the system (or reform) is deemed
progressive.
We evaluate how four speciﬁc reform proposals would alter redistribu-
tion from rich to poor. Thep roposals were chosen to represent the broad
spectrum of possible approaches to reforming Social Security. One set of
reforms would either privatize the system or switch to a system based en-
tirely on mandatory individual accounts with beneﬁts that depend on con-
tributions (e.g., Feldstein and Samwick 1998). Transition costs aside, such
a plan does not redistribute, but provides beneﬁts equal to the present
value of one’s own contributions. In our model, the net tax rate under such
a system is zero, and the redistributive consequences of this type of reform
are thesameasthe“repeal”ofSocialSecurity.Second,weevaluatethepro-
posal of the National Commission on Retirement Policy (NCRP; 1999).
This plan redirects 2 percentage points of the payroll tax into deﬁned con-
tribution individual accounts, and it dramatically cuts other beneﬁts to
balance the Social Security budget at that reduced tax rate. Third, we look
at the plan of Aaron and Reischauer (1998), which suggests smaller spe-
ciﬁc changes without fundamentally altering the nature of Social Security.
In order to close the long-run imbalances, this plan relies heavily on higher
returns generated by investing the trust fund in private ﬁnancial markets.
Fourth, we calculate eﬀects of the Moynihan (1999) plan that depletes the
current Social Security trust fund through lower tax rates now and then
switches to true PAYGO ﬁnancing.
Them odel used in this chapter was developed elsewhere to evaluate the
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and Glass 2000). In that analysis, we found that the current system redis-
tributes little, if anything, from rich to poor. In the current chapter, we
ﬁnd that each of the proposed reforms is a somewhat regressive change to
the current system.
Then ext two subsections describe our model and review the existing
literature on the redistributive eﬀects of Social Security. Section 5.2 pro-
vides more detail on the model, and section 5.3 provides more detail on
the four reforms. Section 5.4 discusses our basic results, and section 5.5
discusses the sensitivity of those results to alternative assumptions. Section
5.6 concludes.
5.1.1 Overview of the Model
We assume that all working years and retirement years come under a
single Social Security system. Thus, we assess long-run redistributive ef-
fects of the current system and of several reforms. Within this steady-state
context, we take account of the ways in which Social Security redistributes
across groups deﬁned by income, gender, and marital status. That is, while
we report only the redistributions between lifetime income quintiles, we
account for heterogeneity within each such quintile. Thus we capture the
fact that diﬀerent income groups have diﬀerent proportions of individuals
who are single or married, male or female, and employed continuously or
sporadically, and who have diﬀerent mortality rates.
We use twenty-two years of wage rates from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) to estimate wage rate proﬁles for diﬀerent kinds of in-
dividuals (household heads, full-time secondary workers, and part-time
secondary workers). The estimated coeﬃcients areu sed to project each
individual’s wage rates before and after the sample period, so that each
individual has a complete wage proﬁle from age twenty-two to sixty-six
(extended through age sixty-nine for plans with retirement at age seventy).
Thew ager atef or each year is multiplied by a total time endowment to
calculate potential earnings, and the present value of this endowment is
used to categorize individuals into quintiles from rich to poor. Lifetime
resources for husbands and wives are pooled so that they are always classi-
ﬁed in the same quintile.
Next, for each quintile, actual earnings are used to estimate earnings
proﬁles. We estimate Tobit earnings regressions and again use the coeﬃ-
cients to project out-of-sample earnings for each individual, so that each
member of our sample has a complete lifetime earnings history. We then
derive income-diﬀerentiated mortality rates, and we use those mortality
probabilities with constructed earnings histories to calculate each individ-
ual’s expected lifetime Social Security taxes and beneﬁts. Finally, we add
over the individuals in each quintile to determine the net impact of Social
Security on each group under the current system and proposed reforms.
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model. As noted below, previous studies use stylized groups, or smoothly
estimated proﬁles for each group. In contrast, the use of actual earnings
data allows us to incorporate diﬀerential eﬀects of human capital invest-
ment, illnesses, child rearing, and other events that aﬀecte a rnings and
may lead individuals to enter and exit the labor force. We also give special
attention to diﬀerentialmortalityratesbygender,race,andlifetimeincome.
Distributional eﬀects of the current system also represent the eﬀects of
a major reform, namely, the repeal of Social Security or complete priva-
tization. In addition, we calculate eﬀects of three speciﬁc reforms, and we
compare the progressivity of those reforms to a proportional cut in all
beneﬁts (with a comparable overall net tax rate). For each plan, we plot
the net tax rate as a function of income. We compare the slopes of these
curves because of our interest in long-run redistributions between rich and
poor, but we ignore the levels of these curves because our model does not
capture redistributions between current generations and long-run future
generations.
5.1.2 Overview of Existing Literature
The Social Security system takes taxes from both a high-wage person
and a low-wage person during working years, and it provides beneﬁts to
both individuals when retired. We wish to measure how much of this
money is transferred between individuals, rather than merely transferred
from the working years to the retirement years of the same person.
Initial tax incidence studies like Pechman and Okner (1974) used group-
ings based on annual income. This type of study would ﬁnd that the Social
Security system is progressive, but it aggregates unlike individuals. The
low-annual-income group may include both the working poor and those
whoh aver etired from a high-earning career. Some later studies like that
of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) include lifetime proﬁles and lifetime de-
cision making in order to determine how Social Security redistributes be-
tween young and old. However, this study does not distinguish between
diﬀerent lifetime income groups of the same cohort.1
Although much work has focused on intergenerational eﬀects of the So-
cial Security system, Aaron (1977) initiates a growing literature on intra-
generational redistribution. Some researchers use arbitrary levels of in-
come for diﬀerent groups. For example, of the studies by Hurd and Shoven
(1985) and Boskin et al. (1987), each uses three groups (e.g., median in-
come, half the median, and ﬁve times the median).2 Thea pproach of using
1. Nelissen (1998) ﬁnds substantial diﬀerences between annual incidence and lifetime inci-
dence for social security in the Netherlands.
2. Panis and Lillard (1996) set the low group at full-time minimum wage earnings, the
middle group at social security’s average earnings, and the high group at the social security
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ever, the calculation of Social Security beneﬁts depends not only on the
levelo flifetime earnings. Recent years often receive more weight, and
somey ears with zero earnings can be dropped from the calculation. Thus,
the beneﬁts received by each group depend on the shape of the earnings
proﬁle and the variance from one year to the next. For these reasons, we
estimate a nonlinear proﬁle separately for each group. We retain actual
earnings data from the sample period and use actual and constructed years
of data with zero earnings. Each group has diﬀerent proportions of individ-
uals with diﬀerent numbers of zero-earnings years that can be dropped
from the beneﬁt calculations (as in Williams 1998).
Some studies have used actual Social Security records to examine issues
of redistribution (Burkhauser and Warlick 1981); Hurd and Shoven 1985;
and Liebman, chap. 1, this volume). Duggan, Gillingham, andG r eenlees
(1993) use records for more than 32,000 workers from the Continuous
Work History Sample of Social Security records. While using Social Secu-
rity records would better identify Social Security earnings histories, two
important elements are missing from the available extracts. First, the ob-
served amount of earnings is generally capped at the annual Social Secu-
rity wage cap, yet only data with wage rates above the cap can fully capture
the regressivity of Social Security taxes that exempt higher wages.3 Second,
and equally important, records for individuals are not linked with records
of spouses.
Fullerton and Rogers (1993) also estimate proﬁles separately for twelve
diﬀerent lifetime income groups and use them to calculate the incidence
of various taxes, but they do not look at Social Security beneﬁts. More
recently, Altig et al. (1997) employ the same twelve lifetime income groups
in their model of tax incidence, and Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser
(1998) use that model to look at Social Security. These computational gen-
eral equilibrium models can calculate the eﬀects of Social Security reforms
on factor returns in each period, but each of the twelve groups is assumed
to contain homogeneous individuals. Since everyone in a group must work
the average amount for that group, these general equilibrium models can-
not incorporate heterogeneity, such as the existence of a fraction in each
group that has zero earnings.
For these reasons, we do not attempt to build a general equilibrium
model. The point of this chapter is to make use of actual data on diverse
individuals within each lifetime income group. We can thus use the fact
that each group has a diﬀerent proportion of individuals with zero-
tax wage cap. Similar procedures are followed by Myers and Schobel (1983), Steuerle and
Bakija (1994), and Garrett (1995).
3. The true earnings can be estimated, however. For example, Fox (1982) uses information
on the time of year that an individual reaches the wage cap to infer the full annual earnings.
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viduals who receive fewer beneﬁts because they die earlier. In this way,
we canl ooka tdistributional impacts of speciﬁc elements of the Social
Security system.4
Thel i terature on distributional impacts of speciﬁc elements of the So-
cial Security system is sparse. Flowers and Horwitz (1993) examine the
spousal beneﬁt, whereby low-earner spouses can draw the greater of their
ownc omputed beneﬁt or one-half of the higher-earning spouse’s beneﬁt.
They demonstrate that the spousal beneﬁt calculation is progressive when
compared to an own-beneﬁt calculation. This result is driven by their ﬁnd-
ing that higher-income families consist of spouses with more-equal earn-
ings and that lower-income couples have more disparate earnings. Our
data imply the opposite: more-equal earnings among couples with low
wages. Also, Panis and Lillard (1996) use a low-medium-high income
structure to examine three basic reforms: the increase of the retirement
age, the increase of payroll taxes, and the decrease of beneﬁts. The eﬀects
of these reforms on progressivity are not clear.
Starting with Aaron (1977), some have introduced diﬀerential mortality
into the analysis. Rofman (1993) uses a data set that matches demographic
information from the Current Population Survey with Social Security in-
formation on earnings, beneﬁts, and mortality. However, Duleep (1986)
reports that mortality information is severely underreported in the Social
Security records, especially for working-age individuals and minorities.
Garrett (1995) uses mortality estimates from a literature search, while
Panis and Lillard (1996) extract mortality information from the PSID.
Since high-income people live longer, several studies show that accounting
for income-diﬀerentiated mortality seriously dampens the progressivity of
Social Security (e.g., Steuerle and Bakija 1994; Duggan, Gillingham, and
Greenlees 1995; and Panis and Lillard 1996).
Finally, Caldwell et al. (1999) use a large microsimulation model to con-
struct lifetime earnings for many heterogeneous individuals. This model
starts with the 1960 Census Public-Use Microdata Sample and uses esti-
mated transition probabilities to “grow” the sample in one-year intervals.
Fore ach person, they simulate the next year’s income and work status.
Thus, as in our study, they capture diﬀerences in race, gender, the number
of zero-earnings years, diﬀerential mortality, and wage rates above the cap.
They focus primarily on intergenerational redistributions, ﬁnding that, al-
though early generations received a good rate of return, postwar genera-
tionsr eceive smaller and even negative rates of return.
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4. By concentratingo nd ollar ﬂows, however, we miss the eﬀecto fthis social insurance
program on the utility of risk-averse individuals (see Geanakopolos, Mitchell, and Zeldes
1998). The beneﬁts of risk reduction may be larger for low- or high-income individuals. Lee,
McClellan, and Skinner (1999) calculate such eﬀects for Medicare.5.2 Lifetime Earnings Proﬁles and Net Beneﬁts from Social Security
In this section we describe the data and methodology used to obtain
lifetime earnings proﬁles, to estimate mortality probabilities that diﬀer by
lifetime income, and to calculate net taxes from Social Security. A more
detailed description is provided in the appendix. We use the PSID for the
years 1968 to 1989, which gives us twenty-two years of actual earnings
data for a sample of the population.5 We select a sample consisting of
1,086 heads and 700 wives that is 66 percent of the representative cross-
section. The use of a reduced sample suggests the possibility of bias in our
econometric estimates and our conclusions about the progressivity of So-
cial Security. However, we do not believe our results are biased, for reasons
discussed in the appendix.
The PSID provides only twenty-two years of actual data. In order to ob-
taincompleteproﬁlesofearningsfromagetwenty-twothroughagesixty-six
fore ach of our sample members, we want to be able to generate out-of-
sample earning observations.6 We do this by estimating earnings regres-
sions and using the estimated coeﬃcients to generate the needed observa-
tions. However, as Fullerton and Rogers (1993) demonstrated using data
from the PSID, earnings proﬁles can have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent shapes for
diﬀerent lifetime income groups. We therefore estimate separate earnings
regressions for diﬀerent lifetime income classes.
Our model is somewhat stylized in that we ignore inheritances and
transfers. Our measure of annual income is based on wages, which are zero
forar etired person. Lifetime income is the present value of that annual
income. Note that capital income from life-cycle saving is not part of life-
time income. If the present value of consumption must equal the present
value of labor income, then capital income merely reﬂects rearrangements
in the timing of consumption.
5.2.1 Lifetime Income
We want to estimate a separate earnings regression for each lifetime
income class, and we want a measure of lifetime income that accurately
reﬂects economic well-being. To begin, we calculate an annual wage rate
fore ach member of our sample by dividing annual earnings by hours
5. While data are currently available through 1992, our model was constructed several
yearsa go when data were available only through 1989.
6. We assume that people work until the future normal retirement age of sixty-seven, claim
social security beneﬁts at that point, and do not work after retirement. While the majority
of people retiring in the past decade have claimed early retirement, they receive a reduction
in beneﬁts that is supposed to be actuarily fair. However, early retirees have less education
and are more likely to be retiring from blue-collar jobs, indicating that they have lower life-
time incomes (U.S. Congressional Budget Oﬃce 1999).
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working life, we ﬁrst use all positive wage observations to estimate log
wage proﬁles.7 We estimate separate log wage regressions for heads, full-
time working wives, and part-time working wives. The results of these re-
gressions can be found in the second main section of the appendix. We
regress the log of the wage rate on an individual ﬁxed eﬀecta nd other
variables like age, age squared, and age cubed. Because we have a ﬁxed
eﬀectf or each individual, we cannot use variables that do not vary over
time (like race or gender). However, we do include age interacted with edu-
cation,r ace, and gender. Using the resulting ﬁxed eﬀects and coeﬃcients,
we then ﬁll in missing observations during the sample period and observa-
tionso utside the sample period. The appendix details how we assign a
wage rate to women who have no earnings histories. Nonworking wives
do engage in household production, and assigning them a zero wage may
incorrectly place them in a low lifetime income group for the distributional
analysis. Thus, for each individual, we have a wage rate for every year of
entire economic life from age twenty-two to sixty-six.
We then use this wage rate and multiply it in each year by 4,000 hours
to represent the year’s labor endowment. This product represents the po-
tential earnings of the individual and therefore serves as a measure of his
or her material well-being.8 Using this endowment allows us to abstract
from the actual labor-leisure choice, since someone who chooses to work
lessa nd consume more leisure might be just as well oﬀ as someone who
decides to work more and consume less leisure. Using potential income
also avoids the distortion introduced by the fact that home production
does not show up in the data under hours worked. The wage rate is a
measure of earning power that reﬂects experience, talent, and education.9
Once we have a complete wage proﬁle for each of our heads and wives
fora ges twenty-two to sixty-six, we calculate individual gross lifetime in-
come as















where t indexes the forty-ﬁve years in the individual’s economic lifetime
relevant for Social Security, ages twenty-two to sixty-six, and where the
individual could work a maximum of eighty hours per week for ﬁfty weeks
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7. This estimation of a whole life’s wage proﬁle takes advantage of the fact that some
individuals are in the sample during the early part of their working lives and others are in
the sample for the latter part.
8. For sensitivity analysis, we show net tax rates with two other measures of income: the
present value of actual earnings, and the present value of potential earnings, where leisure is
valued at the average wage rate for the sample instead of the individual’s wage rate.
9. On the other hand, our model may overstate the value of time at home to the extent
that it represents sick days or unemployment.pery ear. Through most of our analysis, we use a value of 2 percent for r,
the real discount rate. Later, we see the eﬀecto fchanging the discount rate.
As couples generally pool their resources, it would be inappropriate to
place husbands and wives individually into separate lifetime income
groups. The low-wage wife of a high-wage husband is not “poor.” We
therefore combine the lifetime income of the husband and wife, and divide
by two to obtain individual lifetime income for each of them. We can now
deal with each member of our sample as an individual and categorize them
into ﬁve lifetime income groups. The 1st quintile has the lowest income,
the 5th quintile the highest income.
5.2.2 Earnings Proﬁles
Once we have classiﬁed people into lifetime income groups based on
what we feel to be an appropriate measure of economic well-being, we
estimate regressions for actual earnings. For each quintile, using our data
from the PSID, the third main section of the appendix describes how we
estimate separate earnings regressions for heads, habitually working wives,
and occasional working wives, for a total of ﬁfteen regressions. We use
both positive and zero earnings observations in a Tobit framework.
Because the Tobit framework is nonlinear, we do not include ﬁxed
eﬀects, as their inclusion would imply inconsistent parameter estimates.
Thee x clusion of ﬁxed eﬀects also means we can use variables in these
earnings regressions that do not vary over time, such as education, race,
and gender. For each regression for the heads, we begin with independent
variables for age, age squared, age cubed, education, education squared,
the product of age and education, a dummy for whether the head is female,
agei n teracted with the female dummy, and a dummy for whether the head
is white. We then eliminate the variables that were insigniﬁcant. We follow
as imilar procedure for habitually working wives and occasionally work-
ing wives.
We next use the estimated coeﬃcients from our earnings regressions to
simulate earnings observations for the out-of-sample years for all individu-
als in our sample.10 We do not use these coeﬃcients to ﬁll in zero earnings
observations during the sample period, because we are interested in actual
earnings, and years spent out of the labor force are relevant for calculating
the costs and beneﬁts of Social Security. In fact, we also simulate a repre-
sentative number of zero earnings years for the out-of-sample portions of
each earnings proﬁle.
5.2.3 Income-Diﬀerentiated Mortality
It is a stylized fact that people with higher lifetime incomes tend to live
longer, a fact that can dampen the progressivity of the beneﬁt structure of
Social Security Reform Proposals and Lifetime Progressivity 157
10. These imputations are independent of each other and are not serially correlated.the Social Security system. We derive a set of mortality probabilities that
varyb yr ace, gender, and our measure of potential lifetime income, so
that we can examine the impact of diﬀerential mortality on redistribution.
Standard mortality tables extend only to age eighty-ﬁve and are diﬀerenti-
ated only by sexa nd race.A sthe fourth part of the appendix describes,
we extend these data in three ways. First, we extend the tables to age
ninety-nine. Second, since individuals with low incomes have higher mor-
tality rates than the population as a whole, we modify the standard tables
by using available information on mortality diﬀerentiated by annual in-
come. Third, we then use that information to construct mortality tables
that are diﬀerentiated among our lifetime income quintiles. In later sec-
tions, we use these tables to compute expected present valueso fSocial
Security taxes and beneﬁts.
Standard mortality tables are provided in Vital Statistics of the United
States (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993).11 For
100,000 individuals alive at age zero, the table shows the number surviving
at each age from one through eighty-ﬁve. Based on standard mortality
tables, a hypothetical twenty-two-year-old white male has probabilities of
survival to age twenty-three of 99.83 percent, survival to age sixty-ﬁve of
75.82 percent, and survival to age eighty-ﬁve of 22.34 percent. We multiply
the tax that would be due or the beneﬁt that would be received at each age
by the probability of attaining that age, and then calculate the present
value of these expected cash ﬂows.
TheN ational Center for Health Statistics obtains death certiﬁcates from
all U.S. states and constructs four “current life tables” (for white males,
whitef e males, nonwhite males, and nonwhite females). Since 31 percent
of the population is still alive at age eighty-ﬁve, the fourth section of the
appendix describes how we extend the tables through age ninety-nine.
These expanded mortality tables allow us to weight tax payments and ben-
eﬁts by the probability of being alive in each year from age twenty-two to
ninety-nine.
Many studies have noted that mortality rates for the poor are higher
than average. A Mortality Study of 1.3 Million Persons (Rogot et al. 1992)
provides a rich source of data on this phenomenon. They show the ob-
served number of deaths for each annual income class of each race, gender,
and ten-year age group. For each such cell, we divide observed deaths (O)
by the expected deaths (E) that would occur if all income classes of that
group had the same mortality rate. We then apply that O/E ratio toe ach
cell in the extended mortality tables. Among white males aged twenty-ﬁve
11. An alternative source of data for our analysis of a hypothetical future cohort would be
projected mortality tables from the Social Security Administration (SSA), which incorporate
projected increases in life expectancies. Using the SSA’s probabilities would decrease the net
tax rate for everyone, as people live longer and draw beneﬁts longer, but it would have no
eﬀecto no ur adjustments for mortality probabilities that diﬀer by lifetime potential income
and so would not substantively alter our conclusions on redistribution.
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atar a t et h a ti s1 6 8percent of the average, while those in the richest annual
income group die at rate that is only 61 percent of the average. For non-
whitef e males of the same age, the poor die at a rate that is 186 percent of
the average, while the rich die at a rate equal to 44 percent of the average.
Although we have the annual household income of each individual in
our sample for each year, we do not use only the corresponding annual
income group’s O/E ratiof or that person in that year to weight mortality
probability. Using annual income would imply that an individual with a
steeply hump-shaped earnings proﬁle would have a probability of dying
that falls dramatically during high annual income years and then rises
again during low annual income years. We do not believe that the same
individual’s probability of death changes that rapidly with annual income,
jumping over other individuals in the same age cohort whose annual in-
comes are not so volatile. Instead, the probability of dying is more likely
aﬀected by the individual’s lifetime income. To address this issue, our pro-
cedure described in the fourth section of the appendix is based on the
relative ranking of each individual’s lifetime income. Basically, a person in
ap articular percentile of the lifetime income distribution is assigned the
O/E ratioo fap erson in the same percentile of the annual income distri-
bution.12
5.2.4 Social Security Taxes Paid
We next compute the value of Social Security taxes for each person in
each year, following the provisions of the Social Security Administration.
This tax is commonly called the FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions
Act) tax. It is collected on earned income and consists of three portions:
Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI), and
Hospitalization Insurance (HI, also known as Medicare). The proceeds
from these taxes are deposited into three separate trust funds, and beneﬁts
arep aid from the appropriate fund. The program has become almost uni-
versal—95 percent of all employment in the United States is covered.13
The tax is deducted from employees’ pay at a rate of 7.65 percent of
wages, but employers match those deductions for a total tax of 15.3 per-
cent. Self-employed individuals pay the entire 15.3 percent tax annually
with their income tax returns. Both the employee and employer shares of
the tax are collected on wages up to an annual maximum amount of tax-
able earnings—the Social Security wage cap ($76,200 for the year 2000).
12. Thus, even if two retirees have the same low annual income, the one with higher lifetime
income is assumed to have a lower mortality probability.
13. Coverage may be excluded for the following: federal civilian workers hired before 1984
whoh ave not elected to be covered; railroad workers who are covered under a similar but
separate program; certain employees of state and local government who are covered by their
state’s retirement programs; household workers and farm workers with certain low annual
incomes; persons with income from self employment of less than $400 annually; and persons
whow orki nthe underground, cash, or barter economy, who may illegally escape the tax.
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levelo fi ndividuals covered by the system, thereby accounting for both
real wage growth and inﬂation.
Since an objective of our research is to measure each worker’s net Social
Security tax burden, the question arises: How much of the total FICA tax
does the worker bear? Using only the statutory incidence (the worker’s
half) would yield much lower burdens than using the combined employer
and employee portions. Hamermesh and Rees (1993, 212) review empirical
worko np ayroll tax incidence and conclude that the worker bears most of
the employer’s share of the tax through reduced wages. We therefore base
oure stimates on the combined employer and employee tax.14
Our focus is the retirement portion of the Social Security system, not
the DI or HI portions. Of the total 15.3 percent tax rate, 2.9 percent is for
Medicare (HI), leaving 12.4 percent for Old Age, Survivors and Disability
Insurance (OASDI). This is the rate cited and modiﬁed by certain reform
proposals, even though 1.8 percent goes to DI. The remaining 10.6 percent
is for OASI, and this is the tax in our model.15 The OASI portion of the tax
is paid directly to the OASI Trust Fund, which is used to pay all retirement
beneﬁts. We ignore the DI and HI portions of the tax, as well as beneﬁts
paid from the DI and HI Trust Funds. In essence, we assume that no one
becomes disabled prior to retirement. If sample members have few earn-
ings observations because they became disabled, they are treated as any
other workers with many years out of the labor force.
Our sample from the PSID includes observed and constructed earn-
ings for each individual from age twenty-two until retirement. To obtain
steady-state taxes and beneﬁts under current law, however, we look at a
hypothetical future cohort with a birth year of 1990. We therefore take Noij,
the “observed” nominal earnings of individual i in year j,a n dw econvert
it to the corresponding future individual’s nominal earnings, Nﬁj,u s i ng the
ratioo fp rojected average earnings in the future year (AEfj)t oo b s erved
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14. Panis and Lillard (1996) point out that because the employer’s portion of the payroll
tax is deductible against the employer’s income tax, the net cost to the employer is lower
than the full amount of the payroll tax paid. Like Panis and Lillard, however, and for compa-
rability with other studies, we treat the entire payroll tax as the employee’s cost of social
security coverage. In eﬀect, we look at the social security system only, without any income
tax. The combined incidence is not equal to the sum of the parts, but we cannot say whether
the income tax aﬀects the incidence of social security, or social security aﬀects the incidence
of the income tax.
15. These allocation percentages are for the year 2000 and beyond. Congress “temporar-
ily” increased the portion going to DI for the years 1994 to 1996, followed by a reduction
for 1997–1999. The 1997 allocation is OASI  10.7 percent, DI  1.7 percent, and HI 
2.9 percent.Since 1951, the Social Security Administration has computed average
earnings, the average annual earnings of all workers covered under the
Social Security Act. We project this average earnings into the future using
assumptions about future real wage growth and inﬂation.16
In our study, we calculate the present value at age twenty-two of
mortality-adjusted Social Security taxes and beneﬁts through age ninety-
nine. Again, we assume that each person works and retires under a given
system. The probability Pij of individual i being alive at age j is conditional
on being alive at age twenty-two, and it is computed from the constructed
tables (for each age-race-sex-income cell) as the number in cell i alive at
age j divided by the number in cell i alive at age twenty-two. We then
calculate E(SSTij), the expected Social Security tax of person i in year j,a s
(3) SST min CAP ET N P ij ij j ij () ( , ) , =× [] ×
where T is the combined OASI tax rate (which is constant with unchanged
law), CAPj is the maximum nominal earnings subject to the OASI tax
(which increases with inﬂation), and Pij is the probability that person i is
alive at age j.T hese amounts are used to compute the present value of
Social Security taxes paid.
5.2.5 Social Security Beneﬁts
Under the provisions of the Social Security Act, beneﬁts are calculated
from a progressive formula based on the individual’s average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME). Our calculations follow the Social Security Ad-
ministration’s computation of AIME upon the individual’s retirement. In
particular, earnings prior to age sixty are indexed to average wages in the
year the individual attains age sixty. Only earnings at or below the taxable
capi ne ach year are considered. The method of indexing is to multiply the
nominal earnings in year j by the ratio of average earnings in the year age
sixtyw as attained to average earnings in year j.E a rnings after age sixty
aren ot indexed. A person who works from age twenty-two through age
sixty-six (retiring on his or her sixty-seventh birthday) would have a total
of forty-ﬁve years of earnings. Under the act, only the highest thirty-ﬁve
yearsa re considered, so the ten lowest years will be dropped. The AIME
is the simple average of the indexed earnings in those thirty-ﬁve highest-
earnings years.17
Next, the primary insurance amount (PIA) is calculated as 90 percent
16. We use actual inﬂation and growth to scale observed PSID years up to 1995. Since
amounts in future years are indexed, the subsequent inﬂation and growth rates are set to zero.
17. The language of the act speciﬁes dropping the ﬁve lowest years of earnings through
ages ixty-one. Then, if the worker has years of earnings after age sixty-one that are higher
than some earlier years’ earnings, the higher earnings from after age sixty-one will replace
those lower earnings. The net eﬀectf or aw orker retiring at age sixty-seven is to drop the ten
lowest years.
Social Security Reform Proposals and Lifetime Progressivity 161of AIME up to the ﬁrst bend point, plus 32 percent of AIME in excess of
the ﬁrst bend point but less than the second bend point, plus 15 percent
of AIME in excess of that second bend point. The fact that only capped
earnings are used to calculate AIME provides a de facto maximum beneﬁt.
In 1995, the bend points were $426 and $2,567. If AIME were $3,200, for
example, the PIA would be calculated as follows:
(4) PIA =× +× −
+× − =
09 0 4 2 6 03 22 567 426
01 5 3200 2 567 1163 47
.( ) .( , )
.( , , ) $ , . .
Like the cap on earnings, the bend points are adjusted annually by the
proportional increase in average earnings. We calculate this PIA for each
worker in the sample.
Ar etiree is entitled to a beneﬁt equal to the PIA upon “normal” retire-
ment at age sixty-seven. A worker may still choose to retire as early as age
sixty-two, with reduced beneﬁts.18 In contrast, if a worker elects to delay
receipt of beneﬁts to an age as late as seventy, the eventual beneﬁts are
permanently increased by 5 percent per year of delay. Our calculations be-
lowignore these provisions for early or late retirement, as we assume work-
ers (and their spouses) always choose the normal retirement age,19 which
foro ur hypothetical cohort under the current system is sixty-seven.
In addition to retirement beneﬁts for covered workers, the OASI Trust
Fund provides certain beneﬁts to the spouse and other dependents of re-
tiredo rd eceased workers. The spouse of a retired worker can receive the
greater of the beneﬁt based on the spouse’s own earnings, or one-half of
the PIA of the retired worker (designated as the “spousal beneﬁt”). The
spouseo fad eceased worker can receive the higher of the beneﬁt based
on the spouse’s own earnings, or 100 percent of the beneﬁt to which that
workerw as entitled.T he beneﬁtb a sed on the deceased worker’s beneﬁt is
called the “survivor beneﬁt.” We ignore nonspousal survivor beneﬁts; in
aggregate they are relatively minor.20
Our calculations of these amounts are detailed in the ﬁfth main section
of the appendix. We use each individual’s observed and constructed earn-
ings to compute AIME, PIA, the spousal beneﬁt (SpBen), and the survivor
18. This early retirement penalty is a permanent reduction in the PIA of 5/9 percent for
each early month (6.67 percent for each early year). For example, workers retiring at age
sixty-four when the normal retirement age is sixty-seven would receive a beneﬁt for the rest
of their lives that is reduced by 20 percent.
19. This assumption does not aﬀectp rogressivity unless the chosen date of retirement
diﬀers by income. If low-income individuals tend to die earlier, then they might optimally
retire earlier, so the availability of this option might be progressive.
20. In 1996, a total of $302.9 billion in beneﬁts was paid from the OASI trust fund. Of
that total, $288.1 billion was paid to retired workers or their spouses, and only $14.8 billion
(4.9 percent) was paid for the other survivor and miscellaneous beneﬁts (U.S. Social Security
Administration 1997, table 4A.5).
162 Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas Glassbeneﬁt for the surviving spouse (SurvBen) in exact accordance with provi-
sionso fthe act.
5.2.6 Present-Value Net Tax Rates
After we calculate the mortality-adjusted tax and beneﬁt in each year
fore ach individual in each of our lifetime income quintiles, we compute
the present value, at age twenty-two, of the beneﬁts to be received minus
the taxes paid. We then add over the individuals in each lifetime income
quintile. We divide by the present value at age twenty-two of the lifetime
endowment (discounted at the same rate) to arrive at an eﬀective net tax
rate for each group. A system that takes exactly the same fraction of in-
come for all groups is “proportional,” whereas a system that takes a higher
fraction of the income of the rich (poor) is deemed progressive (regressive).
The discount rate should reﬂect a real rate of return that would be avail-
able to participants in the system and that would provide for the same
certainty as does the Social Security system. The trustees of the Social
Security system currently used a rate of 2.8 percent for their long-term
estimate of real returns in their 1998 report.21 Ibbotson Associates (1998)
reports on historic rates of return for various portfolio investments. For
the period 1935 to 1997, the average inﬂation rate was 4.0 percent, and
the nominal return on intermediate-term U.S. Treasury obligations was 5.4
percent, so the real rate of return was 1.4 percent.
Foro ne choice of discount rate we use 2 percent, which lies between the
forecast rate earned by the OASI Trust Fund on its investments (2.8 per-
cent)a nd the historical average of real returns on government bonds re-
ported by Ibbotson (1.4 percent).22 To test the sensitivity of results, we also
use a discount rate of 4 percent. As shown below, the choice of rate aﬀects
noto nly the absolute size of the present value gains or loss for each group
but also the pattern of progressivity.
5.3 Proposed Reforms and their Treatment in our Model
Our evaluation of Social Security reform is limited in many respects.
First, because we focus on distributional eﬀects, we ignore behavioral
eﬀects such as changes in labor supply or saving. Second, since we cannot
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21. In arriving at that rate, they forecast inﬂation at a long-term rate of 3.5 percent, and a
nominal interest rate of 6.3 percent on the special-issue U.S. Treasury obligations that are
purchased by the OASI trust fund. Whether to use a before-tax or after-tax discount rate
depends on one’s assumption about what alternative retirement investments are available.
22. Other studies of social security redistribution have used rates on either side of 2 per-
cent.M y ers and Schobel (1983) use 2 percent, Hurd and Shoven (1985) use 3 percent, Boskin
et al. (1987) use 3 percent, Duggan, Gillingham, and Greenlees (1993) use 1.2 percent,
Steuerle and Bakija (1994) use 2 percent, and Gramlich (1996) uses 2.3 percent. In contrast,
Caldwell et al. (1999) use 3, 5, or 7 percent.evaluate all of the many suggested reform proposals, we focus on only four
of the major ones. Third, since most of these proposals are still evolving,
we evaluate only versions that were available in written form in early 1999.
Fourth, since each such proposal is too complicated to capture fully in
ourm odel, we really just evaluate “stylized” versions of these reforms. In
particular, since we consider only long-run provisions, we ignore any
phase-in of a change in the normal retirement age.23 Since we assume ev-
erybody retires at that normal retirement age, we also ignore the eﬀects of
proposed changes in the early retirement age. Additionally, since we have
only one “discount rate” in our model, with no consideration of risk, we
cannot capture the welfare eﬀects of any plan to switch some of the Social
Security trust fund from government bonds to investments in corporate
stocks and bonds.
Because we miss some of these ways in which each reform might raise
net revenue, especially during the transition,w ec annot comment on the
extentt ow hich each reform might close the existing Social Security deﬁcit.
Each plan extends the solvency of the program to seventy-ﬁve years. Some
extends olvency indeﬁnitely, while others have large annual cash ﬂow deﬁ-
cits at the end of seventy-ﬁve years. Thus each of the plans evaluated is
diﬀerent in present value, and the long-run features that we consider raise
diﬀerent amounts of net revenue for each plan. As a consequence, some of
the plans appear in our model to have higher overall net tax rates than
others. We emphasize, however, that our goal is to compare the progressi-
vity of these plans and not their overall net tax rates.
As described above, we do capture the major long-run provisions of
Social Security that determine taxes and beneﬁts for individuals in diﬀer-
entc ircumstances. We now describe proposed changes to these provisions,
as summarized in table 5.1. Column (1) of this tabler epresents the current
system. It does not list all features of the current system, only the main
ones that would be reformed by one of the plans.
5.3.1 The Feldstein-Samwick Plan
An umber of proposals would completely privatize Social Security. The
proposal outlined by Feldstein and Samwick (1998) is typical of these
plans. It speciﬁes a transition from the current system to one in which the
beneﬁts are equivalent to those guaranteed under the current system, but
in which these beneﬁts in the long run are funded entirely by mandatory
contributions to individual accounts made over a lifetime. The balances in
23. Legislation already enacted will increase the retirement age by two months each year
beginning in the year 2000, so that by 2005 the normal retirement age will be sixty-six. An-
other two month per year increase will begin in 2017, resulting in a normal retirement age
of sixty-seven after the year 2021. All of the reform proposals we consider would eliminate
the pause from 2005 to 2017 and reach the new higher normal retirement age sooner.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the individual accounts would be invested in private debt and equity
markets.
We do note x plicitly model the Feldstein-Samwick plan, or any other
plan based on individual accounts, as such plans involve little or no redis-
tribution (except to the extent that some privatization plans include mini-
mum beneﬁts and survivor beneﬁts).24 In our modeling framework, such
plans are equivalent to the repeal of the system. Our model is better suited
to capturing the eﬀects of reforms that do not alter the basic tax and bene-
ﬁt nature of the current system. Thus, in our model, the eﬀects of the
Feldstein-Samwick plan are the opposite of the eﬀects of the current Social
Security system.
5.3.2 The National Commission on Retirement Policy (NCRP) Plan
The 1999 NCRP proposal is also associated with the names of Senators
Breaux andG r egg andR epresentatives Kolbe and Stenholm. One version
is a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plan based on the current OASDI tax rate, but
we evaluate only the other version, which sets aside 2 percentage points of
each person’s tax into a mandatory individual saving account (ISA). Since
each retired individual receivesb ack his or her own ISA, plus earnings,
such a mandatory savings plan does not redistribute between members of
ag eneration in the long run. It has a net present value tax of zero for each
individual and therefore does not enter our calculations. The remaining
“tax and beneﬁt” portion of this plan is scaled back from current law. As
shown in the ﬁrst row of table 5.1, the OASDI tax rate is cut from 12.4
percent to 10.4 percent.25 Then ext row shows that this plan does not
change the wage cap.
With taxes cut substantially, closing the Social Security deﬁcit means
that beneﬁts must be cut dramatically. The NCRP plan cuts beneﬁts in
severalw ays. Thel argest cut is in the calculation of beneﬁts called the PIA
in equation (4). In that calculation, “PIA factors” are applied to AIME
between the bend points. As shown in the third row of table 5.1, the long-
run NCRP plan would still provide 90 percent of AIME up to the ﬁrst
bend point, but the 32 percent rate between the two bend points is cut to
21.36 percent, and the 15 percent rate above the second bend point is cut
to 10.01 percent. Thus, beneﬁts are cut disproportionately for high-income
individuals. This change is progressive, even in a lifetime context, as we
conﬁrm below.
In fact, this plan adds beneﬁts to low-income individuals, another pro-
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24. Also, individual accounts that require annuitization at a single rate will retain some
redistribution due to diﬀerential mortality (see Brown, chap. 10 in this volume).
25. These reforms state changes in terms of the current 12.4 percent OASDI rate, as shown
in the table. However, 1.8 percentage points of that tax go to disability insurance (DI), and
we model only OASI. With the 2 points diverted into ISA accounts, the 10.6 percent OASI
rate becomes 8.6 percent.gressive change. Current law has a small “minimum beneﬁt” that depends
on the number of quarters of earnings but that can reach as high as $6,235
pery ear( at 1995 levels, but indexed). As indicated in the next row of table
5.1, the NCRP plan would raise this minimum beneﬁt to the indexed
“aged individual poverty level” (AIPL), which was $7,761 in 1995 (a 24
percent increase).
Then ext biggest cut in beneﬁts occurs through the NCRP’s increase in
the ultimate normal retirement age (NRA) from sixty-seven to seventy.26
This change is regressive for three reasons. First, it means that individuals
will work and pay taxes for more years, and those taxes are generally re-
gressive because they apply only to earnings below the wage cap. Second,
it means that individuals will retire later and receive beneﬁts for fewer
years. Because the beneﬁt schedule is progressive, that cut in beneﬁts is
regressive. Third, because of income-diﬀerentiated mortality, the higher re-
tirementagemeansthatlow-incomeindividualshaveadisproportionatein-
crease in their chance of dying before they receive retirement beneﬁts.
The NCRP plan also changes the number of years’ earnings used in the
AIME calculation. Current rules use thirty-ﬁve years, which means that
ten years of low earnings can be dropped from the calculation. This in-
cludes the ﬁve years that can be dropped before the AIME calculation at
ages ixty-two and the additional ﬁve years of earnings after age sixty-two
that can be used to replace lower earnings from before sixty-two. The
NCRP plan says it would “include earnings for all years,” and we interpret
this to mean all years up to the AIME calculation. Since the NCRP plan
raises the early retirement age (and AIME calculation) from sixty-two to
sixty-ﬁve, the individual can still use ﬁve subsequent years of earnings
(until retirement at age seventy) to replace lower earnings from before
sixty-ﬁve. In other words, eﬀectively, ﬁve years still can be dropped.27
Under current law, any married retiree can receive the higher of his or
her own beneﬁt or half of what the spouse receives. This latter option is
called the spousal beneﬁt. The next row of table 5.1 shows that the NCRP
plan would allow only one-third of the spouse’s beneﬁts. This cut would
most aﬀecta ny person whose income is low relative to his or her spouse,
but remember that we do not count that person as “poor” (because we
26. Like other reforms considered here, the NCRP plan would also later increase the NRA
abovea ge seventy to account for subsequent increases in longevity (to maintain a constant
number of expected years of life after retirement). We cannot model this provision as an
increase in the retirement age, unless we were also to raise survival probabilities (which
would roughly maintain the expected number of years of beneﬁts).
27. In Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (1999), we use the same model to analyze the redis-
tributive impact of speciﬁc reform components. We found any reduction in the number of
drop years allowed to be a regressive reform. Including the low-earning years reduces AIME
somewhat more for low-income workers because they have more zero-earning years. In addi-
tion, that decline in AIME reduces beneﬁts at the 90 percent PIA factor for individuals
below the ﬁrst bend point, and it reduces beneﬁts at a low PIA factor for those with income
above the bend points.
Social Security Reform Proposals and Lifetime Progressivity 167assume each person gets half of the couple’s total income). Perhaps sur-
prisingly, this change is slightly progressive. As it turns out, middle- and
high-income couples have more disparate incomes and make greater use
of the spousal beneﬁt.
While the current system is fully indexed for inﬂation, it uses the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI). This index has been criticized foro v erstating
inﬂation and therefore scaling up beneﬁts by more than necessary amounts
to maintain living standards for retired beneﬁciaries. The NCRP plan, like
other reform plans, would require a downward revision in the CPI, which
would raise some net revenue. If the issue were described only in terms of
accurate indexation for inﬂation, then we would not be able to capture
this provision. If the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not change the CPI,
however, the reform says that beneﬁts will be indexed explicitly to the CPI
minus 0.5 percentage points. We model that change as a real cut in bene-
ﬁts. Speciﬁcally, real beneﬁts fall at 0.5 percent per year, starting at the
age of retirement. Because the beneﬁt schedule is progressive, any cut in
beneﬁts would normally be regressive. However, beneﬁts are cut more for
those who live longer and continue to experience real beneﬁt cuts each
year. Since high-income individuals live longer, this particular form of ben-
eﬁt cut has uncertain eﬀects. As it turns out, the net eﬀecto fthis provision
is somewhat regressive in our model.
Thus, some aspects of the NCRP plan are progressive, and some are
regressive. Our calculations below will show the net eﬀects of all these
changes together. Table 5.1 also lists a few provisions that are not captured
by ourm odel. The NCRP plan would also raise the age for early retire-
ment from sixty-two to sixty-ﬁve (to match the three-year increase in the
NRA from sixty-seven to seventy). It would extend OASDI coverage to
all state and local government employees hired after 1999. Under current
law, if a Social Security beneﬁciary works after normal retirement age,
retirement beneﬁts are reduced by $1 for every $3 earned above a certain
threshold. This feature is not captured in our model, because we assume
no earnings after retirement. The NCRP plan would also eliminate this
retirement earnings test for individuals after NRA (seventy).
5.3.3 The Aaron and Reischauer (A&R) Plan
Any reform plan must face fundamental choices about the very nature
of Social Security. The current system is partially funded, so a reform
could raise revenue and create a fully funded program, or it could return
to the original pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) idea. The current system is explic-
itlyat r ansfer program that redistributes from workers to retirees, to those
with low income, to nonearning spouses, and to women (because they live
longer). Any reform could choose either to remove these transfer elements
or to enhance them.
Rather than make wholesale changes to Social Security, the plan devised
168 Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas Glassby Aaron and Reischauer (1998) would “ﬁx” the current system. It would
“close the projected long-term deﬁcit and make Social Security better re-
ﬂect current social and economic conditions, while preserving Social Secu-
rity’s fundamental character” (96). As a consequence, this plan tinkers
with a number of provisions in ways that individually raiseabit of revenue
while closing a signiﬁcant portion of the projected shortfall by investing
the trust fund in private debt and equity markets.
The A&R plan is summarized in column (3) of table 5.1. As it turns
out, many of these changes appear at the bottom of the column, under
features “not captured by our model.” The A&R plan would raise the earli-
est eligibility age (EEA) from sixty-two to sixty-four (to match the cur-
rently provided two-year increase in the NRA from sixty-ﬁve to sixty-
seven). Like other plans, it would cover all new state and local employees.
Whereas current law collects income tax on Social Security beneﬁts only
above some threshold, the A&R plan would tax Social Security beneﬁts
just as if it were a private pension.28 As mentioned above, the A&R plan
would also raise some money by transferring part of the Social Security
Trust Fund from government bonds to higher-yielding corporate stocks
and bonds. We use only one discount rate, ignoring diﬀerent risk premia,
so we do notc a pture this provision either. We might note, however, that
many of these ignored provisions have no obvious implications for redistri-
bution.
Thet op of column (3) shows the provisions of the A&R plan that are
captured in our model. First, this plan would change the number of years
of earnings used in the AIME calculation from thirty-ﬁve to thirty-eight.
Including more low-earning years means that AIME is reduced, and thus
beneﬁts are lower. The calculation still drops four years before the AIME
calculation, and it still uses three more years (from sixty-four to sixty-
seven) to substitute for earlier low-earning years. Thus it drops the seven
lowest-earning years to age sixty-seven. Like the NCRP plan, the A&R
plan would raise a bit of money by cutting the spousal beneﬁt from one-
half to one-third of the beneﬁts of the higher-earning spouse. As men-
tioned above, the reduction in the number of dropped years is regressive
and the reduction in the spousal beneﬁt somewhat progressive—at least
by ourm e asurements, according to which each spouse’s well-being is
based on half of the couple’s lifetime income.
Next, the A&R plan makes a change to the “survivor’s beneﬁt,” which
currently allows awidow or widower toreceivehisorher ownbeneﬁt or the
deceasedspouse’sbeneﬁt(whicheverislarger).Inthetable,thisruleisrepre-
sented by “max (hus, wife).” Instead, the A&R plan would provide three-
28. That means it would exempt the amount that was already subjected to income tax
(such as the employee’s payroll tax share, which comes out of taxable income), but it would
tax the rest of social security beneﬁts—since those dollars have not yet been subject to in-
come tax.
Social Security Reform Proposals and Lifetime Progressivity 169quarters of the combined beneﬁts of both spouses (“3/4[huswife]”). The
logic for this change is based on the cost of living for one person compared
to the cost for two together. Compared to current law, however, it provides
more beneﬁts to some individuals and less to others. If two spouses had
the same earnings, for example, then either person’s survival beneﬁt would
become three-quarters of the total, which is 50 percent more than under
current law (according to which either person would get half of the total).
If a lower-earning spouse had own beneﬁts of less than one-third of those
of the higher-earning spouse, then either person’s new survivor’s beneﬁt
would be less than under current law.29 In our calculations, this particular
provision is found to be progressive. As mentioned above, low-income cou-
ples tend to have more similar incomes, since both must work at low-
paying jobs. Equal incomes gain from this reform provision. Middle- and
high-income couples tend to have more disparate incomes, since they can
aﬀordf or onep erson to stay at home, and thus gain less or actually lose
from this proposal.
Finally, the A&R plan would undertake unspeciﬁed corrections in the
CPI. The reasoning is the same as that described above, namely, that the
current CPI has been criticized forg rowing too quickly. This plan would
leave those corrections to the economics experts, however, and not sub-
tract any number of points from the CPI. With the system fully indexed
to an accurate measure of inﬂation, we assume that real beneﬁts are main-
tained.
Again, some of these provisions are progressive and some regressive.
Most are small, however, and so the overall progressivity of the A&R plan
is not expected to diﬀer much from that of current law. As we show below,
the A&R plan is slightly more progressive than the current Social Secu-
rity system.
5.3.4 The Moynihan Plan
In terms of fundamental choices about the nature of Social Security,
Senator Moynihan’s 1999 reform proposal would head in a diﬀerent direc-
tion.W hereas the 1983 changes raised revenue to generate a partially
funded Social Security trust fund, this plan would return to PAYGO. The
current trust fund would be drawn down by a temporary reduction in the
current 12.4 percent OASDI tax rate to 11.4 percent (for the years 1999–
2000) and to 10.4 percent (for 2001–2024). Then, when the trust fund is
depleted, and that tax on a smaller number of workers is not enough to
cover the beneﬁts for a larger number of retirees, the rate would have to
rise again to 11.4 percent (for 2025–29), 12.4 percent (for 2030–44), 12.7
percent (for 2045–54), 13.0 percent (2055–59), and 13.4 percent thereafter.
These numbers are summarized in the top of column (4) of table 5.1.
29. The break-even point is the point at which one’s beneﬁt is one-third of the higher-
earning spouse’s beneﬁt, because (3/4)(1  1/3)  max (1/3, 1).
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the Moynihan plan must be represented by the 13.4 percent tax rate. We
show results with the 13.4 percent rate in our tables below. In the long run,
with this rate, overall net tax rates on all individuals are substantially
higher than for the other reforms (and higher than for current law). The
reason is that this plan disperses the trust fund to those of us in current
generations—by lowering our overall net tax rates. For this reason, results
below also show the eﬀects of the Moynihan plan with the low 10.4 per-
cent rate.
Thew agec ap was $76,200 in year 2000, and it is projected to reach
$82,800 in 2003. As indicated in the second row of the table under the
current system, this wage cap will cover about 85 percent of wages. This
percentage has been falling, because high wage rates have been growing
faster than average wages. The Moynihan plan would raise the wage cap
to $97,500 in 2003, which would cover about 87 percent of wages, and it
would still be indexed thereafter. We calculate the real increase in the long-
run wage cap for our model. This change is progressive, because it collects
additional payroll tax from those above the current wage cap. On the other
hand, we should note, the increase in the OASDI tax rate to 13.4 percent
is regressive, given any wage cap, because it collects only from those below
the cap. Again, our model can calculate the net eﬀect onp r o g r e s sivity.
TheM o ynihan plan also speeds up the currently scheduled increase in
the NRA to sixty-seven, and it continues that increase to the age of seventy
(for those retiring in 2073 and later). This change is regressive, for three
reasons mentioned above: First, individuals pay the regressive payroll tax
for more years; second, they receive the progressive beneﬁt schedule for
fewery ears; third, low-income workers also die sooner, so the fall in their
survival probability from age sixty-seven to seventy is greater than for
high-income workers.
Because it increases the normal retirement age by three years (from
sixty-seven to seventy), the Moynihan plan also increases the number of
yearso fe a rnings in the AIME calculation by three (from thirty-ﬁve to
thirty-eight). The lowest ten years of earnings are still ignored. This change
is regressive, for reasons mentioned in note 27.
Like the NCRP, the Moynihan plan requires a reduction in the index
used to maintain real beneﬁts after retirement. If those corrections are not
made within the CPI, then beneﬁts will be indexed by the CPI minus 1
percentage point. We model this change as a 1 percent cut in real beneﬁts
each year after retirement.
Theb ottom of column (4) of the table indicates the provisions of the
Moynihan plan that are not captured by our model. Like other reforms, it
extends coverage to all new state and local workers. Like the NCRP plan,
it eliminates the current earnings test for those beyond the retirement age
who work. While the NCRP plan would eliminate this test at age seventy,
the Moynihan plan would eliminate it at age sixty-two. Finally, like the
Social Security Reform Proposals and Lifetime Progressivity 171A&R plan, the Moynihan plan would change the income tax to cover all
Social Security beneﬁts as if they were private pensions.
5.4 Results
Our initial simulations use the enacted provisions of the Social Security
Act, applied to a future cohort born in 1990. Results are presented in table
5.2.The last row shows the overall average undiscounted taxes paid minus
beneﬁts received, in thousands of dollars per person. The reason for show-
ing undiscounted net taxes is to shed some light on the overall solvency of
the Social Security system. Our model cannot project actual inﬂows and
outﬂows, since we do not use demographic forecasts, but a conceptual
point can be made about solvency in a world with unchanging demograph-
ics: With a constant number of entering twenty-two-year-olds in each of
the sex-race-income cells in our model, the undiscounted sum of taxes paid
peri ndividual ($103,200) equals the sum of taxes paid by all ages alive at
onet ime. Similarly, the undiscounted sum of beneﬁts ($164,900) is the sum
of beneﬁts paid out to all ages alive at one time. On this basis, the current
Social Security system loses the diﬀerence ($61,700 per twenty-two-year-
old) each year.30
Column (1) of table 5.2 shows the present value net tax as a fraction of
lifetime potential income for each quintile under the current system. This
net tax rate rises from 0.62 percent for the lowest-income quintile to 1.01
percent for the highest-income quintile. Thus, current law is progressive,
butn ot uniformly so. The highest net tax rate applies to the middle-income
quintile (1.07 percent). The beneﬁt structure is progressive, even on a life-
time basis, but that progressivity is largely oﬀsetb ythe regressive tax sys-
tem (which exempts earnings above the wage cap) and by various features
of the system that tend to favor high-income groups (like the fact that
high-income individuals tend to live longer and therefore receive beneﬁts
longer).
Al a r g en u mber of recent articles on Social Security reform have dealt
with privatization of the system or other large-scale overhauls of the pro-
gram (e.g., Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser 1998). If complete privatiza-
tion were to provide actuarially fair returns, with no redistributions be-
tween individuals, then the eﬀects of complete privatization in our model
aree xactly the reverse of those of the current Social Security system. Thus,
the results in this ﬁrst column for the current system can be viewed as the
distributional impact of an extreme reform—the repeal of Social Security.
30. If we multiply this $61,700 ﬁgure by the number of twenty-two-year-olds alive in 1994
(about 3.7 million), we get a total loss of about $228 billion per year. This ﬁgure lies between
the “low” and the “high” deﬁcit projected by the U.S. Social Security Administration (1998).
As mentioned above, their “intermediate” projected deﬁcit for the year 2075 is $480 billion
in 1995 dollars, but that includes DI and pertains to a larger population.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Because the current system is progressive, its repeal would be a regres-
sive change.
Feldstein and Samwick (1998) do not suggest the repeal of the current
system, but instead outline a plan to make it solvent and actuarially fair.
Most importantly, their plan deals with the costs of a transition that hon-
ors the current promise of beneﬁts to existing generations. That transition
does note merge in our long-run model. If the Feldstein-Samwick plan is
actuarially fair in the long run, then it does not take net taxes from anyone.
Column (2) of table 5.2 shows these zero net tax rates in the top panel and
the change from current law in the bottom panel. To the extent that our
calculations accurately reﬂect the long-run progressivity of the current sys-
tem, the change to zero tax rates would be a regressive change, but not
uniformly regressive.
Ther e sults in table 5.2 are illustrated in ﬁgure 5.1, where the net tax
rate for the current system is the lowest of these six lines, rising from 0.62
percent for the ﬁrst income group to 1.07 percent for the middle group
and 1.01 percent for the high-income group. The Feldstein-Samwick plan
would be represented by the horizontal axis, with zero tax rates for all
groups.
The NCRP plan has both progressive and regressive elements. It would
lower the regressive payroll tax by 2 percentage points and make the bene-
ﬁt schedule more progressive, but it would also cut beneﬁts by raising the
retirement age, by including more years of earnings in the beneﬁt calcula-
tion,a nd by reducing the CPI by 0.5 percentage points. Since beneﬁts are
generally progressive, these beneﬁt cuts are regressive. The net eﬀects of
all these changes are shown for the NCRP plan in column (3) of table 5.2.
The net tax rate on the lowest-income group would rise to 1.83 percent,
but the rate on the highest-income group would rise to only 1.77 percent.
Again, the middle group pays the highest tax rate (2.15 percent). The bot-
tom panel of table 5.2 shows that the increase in tax rate is highest for the
group whose income is lowest. Thus, the reform is a regressive change to
the current system. On the other hand, ﬁgure 5.1 shows that the NCRP
systemoverallisfairlyﬂat,withanettaxrateofaround2percentoflifetime
income for all groups.
Theb ottom of the NCRP column in table 5.2 shows the annual short-
fall. By raising the net tax rate for everyone, the NCRP plan is able to
reduce the annual shortfall as measured in our model from $61,700 per
person to only $5,600 per person (and provisions that we do not capture
may raise the rest of the needed revenue tob alance the Social Security
budget). Yet (one might ask) if “balance” means that all Social Security
beneﬁt payments are covered by payroll taxes, then why is the net tax rate
still positive (at about 2 percent of lifetime income)? A zero balance in our
model is represented by total taxes equal to beneﬁts without discounting,
to represent all cohorts alive at one time. In contrast, the net tax rate in




























































































































































































)ourm odel is the discounted present value of one’s taxes minus one’s own
beneﬁts during life. Since taxes come before beneﬁts, discounting means
that the present value of taxes outweigh the present value of beneﬁts, for
ap o s itive net tax rate.31
Aaron and Reischauer (1998) make less dramatic modiﬁcations to So-
cial Security. As indicated earlier, they would raise some revenue in ways
notc a ptured in our model, and they would reduce beneﬁts by raising the
number of years of earnings included in the beneﬁt calculation (from
thirty-ﬁve to thirty-eight). This provision is regressive in our model. The
A&R plan would also cut the spousal beneﬁt from one-half to one-third,
and it would change the survivor’s beneﬁt to three-fourths of the combined
beneﬁts of husband and wife. These changes are both somewhat progres-
sive.C o lumn (4) of table 5.2 shows that the net eﬀectisslightly progressive.
Thel owest-income group’s net tax rate rises only slightly, from 0.62 per-
cent to 0.68 percent, but the highest-income group’s net tax rate rises from
1.01 percent to 1.15 percent. In ﬁgure 5.1, the A&R plan begins near the
current system and raises net tax rates only slightly with income.
TheM o ynihan plan receivest wo columns in table 5.2 (and two curves
in ﬁgure 5.1). Column 5 shows the long-run eﬀects of the Moynihan plan
with a 10.4 percent payroll tax (which actually only applies to years 2001–
2024). Even with this reduced tax, however, net tax rates all rise to at least
2.3 percent because this plan incorporates major beneﬁt cuts. It raises the
retirement age to seventy, includes more low-earning years in the beneﬁt
calculations, and reduces indexing by 1 percentage point. Eﬀectively, each
person’s real beneﬁts are cut by 1 percent per year. Because beneﬁts are
progressive, these beneﬁt cuts are regressive. On the other hand, the cut in
regressive payroll taxes is progressive. Our table and ﬁgure show the net
eﬀects, where this version of the Moynihan plan has a very ﬂat net tax rate
(2.38 percent on the lowest-income group and 2.24 percent on the highest-
income group).32 By removing the small amount of progressivity of current
law, the change is regressive. Tax rates rise by 1.76 percent for the poor
group and by 1.23 percent for the rich.
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31. However, the net tax rates in this table bear no direct relationship to the annual short-
fall shown in the last row. According to the logic in the text, an unfunded PAYGO system
would have zero annual deﬁcit but positive net tax rates. In contrast, a fully privatized system
would have zero taxes and zero beneﬁts, for a zero annual balance and zero net tax rates. A
fully funded tax and beneﬁt scheme could have a zero net tax rate overall but positive annual
taxes minus beneﬁts. A related problem not captured in these numbers is that a reform plan
may be designed to balance the social security budget in a present value sense, and not
necessarily in each year of the long run we calculate. The diﬀerence is the transition. A plan
may employ higher positive net tax rates in the long run just to help pay for the currently
promised but unfunded beneﬁts to the current generations.
32. This column is a bit misleading because it uses a short-run tax rate (10.4 percent in
2001–24) with a long-run retirement age (which takes eﬀecti nthe year 2065). Similarly, the
column with the 13.4 percent tax rate probably overstates the eﬀects of this plan. The truth
may lie in between.Theo ther version of the Moynihan plan employs the eventual 13.4 per-
cent tax rate (after year 2060) and is reﬂected in column (6) of the table.
Net tax rates rise even more, ranging from 4.05 percent for the lowest-
lifetime-income group to 3.52 percent for the highest-lifetime-income
group. Again the change is regressive, to the point that the entire system
is now regressive. As shown in the ﬁgure, these net tax rates all lie well
above those of any other plan. The reason is related to the switch back to
PAYGO. This plan depletes the current partial funding of Social Security.
Without a trust fund that earns a rate of return, eventual tax rates must
be much higher to balance the Social Security budget year by year.
Current law may not be a relevant comparison, however, if it is not sus-
tainable. Even if policy makers omit these reforms and do nothing, the
budget shortfall may necessitate eventual cuts in beneﬁts or increases in
taxes. Therefore, as an alternative basis of comparison, we also show the
eﬀects of a proportionate cut in beneﬁts (in column [7] of table 5.2). Some-
what arbitrarily, we set this beneﬁt cut to eliminate half of the current
shortfall in our model. This amount of beneﬁt cut aids comparability, be-
cause it places the net tax rates near the middle of the reform plans (see
ﬁgure 5.1). The result is 18.9 percent less beneﬁts for all individuals.
Because the Social Security beneﬁt formula is progressive, we expect
this cut in beneﬁts to be regressive. In fact, the wish to avoid the regressiv-
ityo fthis eventual “forced” cut in beneﬁts would seem to be a reason that
policy makers wish to plan ahead by designing their own reforms now. As
it turns out, however, this do-nothing approach is no more regressive than
the other planned approaches. In table 5.2, the net tax rate rises from 1.56
percent on the poor group to 1.89 percent on the middle group, and then
falls back to 1.60 percent on the rich group. In ﬁgure 5.1, the line that
represents this proportional beneﬁt cut has the same shape as the lines for
the reform plans: mostly ﬂat, with some tendency to rise in the middle of
the lifetime income distribution.
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We now vary someo fthe crucial assumptions of the model and observe
how much these assumptions aﬀecto ur results. Instead of showing many
additional numbers in tables, however, we show only ﬁgures. Comparison
to ﬁgure 5.1, then, reveals important diﬀerences.
First, we consider an increase in the discount rate from 2 percent to 4
percent. As discussed in section 5.2.6, this discount rate is supposed to
reﬂect the alternative rate of return available to savers. Most studies of
Social Security use a rate like our 2 percent, but Caldwell et al. (1999) and
others argue that the rate should be higher. If so, results might more closely
resemble the results witha4p e r c e n td i s c o u n tr a t ei nﬁ g u r e5.2.
As is immediately evident from a comparison of ﬁgures 5.1 and 5.2, an
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more regressive. Recall that all plans have oﬀsetting eﬀects: Payroll taxes
in all plans are regressive (because of the wage cap) and beneﬁts in all
plans are progressive (because of the formula). Yet taxes are paid before
retirement, and beneﬁts are received after. Therefore, a higher discount
rate reduces the weight on these later progressive beneﬁts, and it thereby
increases the relative weight on the earlier regressive taxes. Figure 5.2
shows that net tax rates now slope down for the current system and all
reform plans. One plan is not really more regressive than another. The
order of the plans is about the same as before, with the lowest net tax rates
for current law, followed by A&R, the beneﬁt cut, and the Moynihan plan.
TheM o ynihan plan with a 13.4 percent payroll tax rate still has net tax
rates signiﬁcantly above the other plans. One other noteworthy point is
that all systems have higher net tax rates than in ﬁgure 5.1. The increase
in the discount rate reduces the present value of taxes, but it reduces the
present value of beneﬁts by more.
Second, we consider a redeﬁnition of lifetime income. Up to this point,
we have argued that lifetime potential income should include the value of
leisure and time spent at home. We wish to classify individuals from those
who are well oﬀ to those who are not, and that time at home provides part
of the well-being of those individuals. Consider, for example, one individ-
ual who works forty hours per week at $10 per hour and another individ-
ual who works twenty hours per week at $20 per hour. Previous studies
that classify individuals by actual earnings would put both of these indi-
viduals into the same income group. Instead, we argue that the second
individual is “richer” because he or she has the same take-home pay as
well as the extra twenty hours per week at home to care for children, cook
dinner, clean house, do the gardening, or just relax.
These are the reasons that we assign each individual 4,000 hours per
year valued at that individual’s wage rate. As a consequence, however, this
“potential” income may be about twice the value of actual earnings (of a
person who works about 2,000 hours per year). When we use this larger
measure of potential earnings in the denominator of our net Social Secu-
rity tax rate calculation, the resulting net tax rates are lower than in other
previous studies.
To make our results more comparable to those from previous studies.
ﬁgure 5.3 provides net tax rates based on actual earnings. Speciﬁcally, the
present value of Social Security taxes minus beneﬁts is divided by the pres-
entv alue of actual earnings for each group. We do not reclassify individu-
als into quintiles based on actual earnings. (For comparability with the
basicr e sults in ﬁgure 5.1, we return to the 2 percent discount rate of ﬁg-
ure 5.1.)
When the measure of income in the denominator is cut approximately
in half, the net tax as a fraction of income is about twice the size it was




























































































































)before. Otherwise, ﬁgure 5.3 looks much like ﬁgure 5.1. The current Social
Security system has the lowest overall net tax rates and is slightly progres-
sive.T he A&R plan features net tax rates that are not much higher and
slightly more progressive. The proportional beneﬁt cut has the next higher
net tax rates, and it is fairly proportional (rather than progressive). The
NCRP plan is then followed by the Moynihan plans, where all are approxi-
mately proportional. The high-rate Moynihan plan looks a bit more re-
gressive than the others (just as in ﬁgure 5.1).
Finally, we consider a diﬀerent redeﬁnition of lifetime income. Even if
all agree that an individual’s well-being includes the value of time at home,
we could still debate the price at which to value that leisure. Up to this
point, leisure has been valued at the individual’s wage rate. To the extent
that an individual can choose what amount to work, an hour at home must
be worth at least that individual’s wage rate, or else that person would
instead have worked that hour.
Ap roblem with this valuation, however, is that a given hour of leisure
activity is worth more to a high-wage person than to a low-wage person.
Implicitly, the assumption is that the high-wage person receivesm orew ell-
being or more enjoyment from each hour of leisure. As an alternative, we
consider a measurement based on a common set of prices to evaluate all
goods that diﬀerent individuals receive.T his alternative measurement
takes the view that a person is classiﬁed as well oﬀ if he or she receives
more goods: more food, more furniture, or more leisure. To determine
whether one person’s bundle is worth more than another person’s bundle,
the researcher would use a given price per unit of each good (such as food,
furniture, or leisure). Actual income or actual total expenditure does value
purchased goods at the same prices for all individuals, and it can be aug-
mented to value leisure at the same price for all individuals. To value all
units of leisure at the same price, we use the average of all individuals’
wage rates. The results are shown in ﬁgure 5.4.
With all individuals’ time at home valued at the same wage rate, ﬁgure
5.4 shows that all Social Security plans look more progressive. To explain
this result, note that the revaluation of leisure reduces potential income for
the high-income group (which raises their net tax rate as a fraction of
income) and raises potential income for anyone with less than the average
wage rate (which lowers their net tax rate as a fraction of income). The
important point is simply that the characterization of any tax system as
regressive or progressive depends substantially on the deﬁnition of “in-
come”—a term for which we have no unambiguous deﬁnition.
Otherwise, again, the diﬀerences between the plans are similar to those
in other ﬁgures above. The current system has the lowest overall net tax
rates. The A&R plan’s tax rates are slightly higher and slightly more pro-
gressive. The “beneﬁt cut” is next, followed by the NCRP plan and the






























































































































)Moynihan plan. All look progressive in ﬁgure 5.4, but one is not noticeably
more or lessp rogressive than any other.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter uses a lifetime framework to address questions about the
progressivity of Social Security and proposed reforms. We use a large
sample of diverse individuals to calculate lifetime income, to classify indi-
viduals into income quintiles, and thent oc alculate the present value net
tax in each group. We note, however, that this type of calculation does not
answer all questions. In addition to redistributing between income groups,
Social Security also redistributes between groups based on age, gender, or
family size, redistribution not shown in our results. Also not addressed
here are questions about eﬀects of Social Security reform on labor supply,
savings, and the government budget.
Recent Social Security reform proposals have many large apparent
diﬀerences. Some would raise revenue to fund all future promises, and
others would deplete the current partial trust fund and return to PAYGO
ﬁnancing. Some would remove implicit transfers between groups, and oth-
ers would enhance them. Some cut the payroll tax, and others increase it.
The retirement age may be raised or not, and the beneﬁt formula may be
changed or not.
In a lifetime context, we ﬁnd that these provisions tend to oﬀset each
other’s eﬀects on progressivity. Each plan has both regressive and progres-
sive elements, so the net eﬀect is not necessarily a great deal diﬀerent from
the current system. Despite these many diﬀerences between the reform
plans, we ﬁnd that they have similar eﬀects on overall progressivity. In our
basicc alculations, the slightly progressive current system would be slightly
more progressive in the A&R plan, and it would become slightly regressive
in each of the other plans. The pattern of progressivity is aﬀected by alter-
native assumptions, but it is aﬀected in similar ways for the current system
and proposed reforms. None of these reforms greatly alters the current
degree of progressivity on a lifetime basis.
Appendix 5A
Data and Methodology
This appendix is divided into ﬁve parts, describing respectively the selec-
tion of the sample from the PSID, the estimation of log wage regressions
and calculation of potential lifetime earnings, the estimation of earnings
Social Security Reform Proposals and Lifetime Progressivity 183proﬁles, the derivation of income-diﬀerentiated mortality, and the calcula-
tion of Social Security beneﬁts.
Data and Sample Selection
We use the PSID for the years 1968 to 1989, which gives us twenty-two
yearso fd ataf or a sample of the population. We select our sample based
on three criteria. First, our sample members are not taken from the low-
income subsample of the PSID. While the data contain weights so that the
low-income sample can be merged with the representative sample, we felt
that the representative sample provided suﬃcientd ataf or our purposes.
Second, we require that sample members remain in the sample for the
entire period. Survey respondents mayh a v edied, or may have simply de-
cided that the survey was no longer worth their time, and we judged that
including individuals such as these was not worth the possible distortion
in the data and additional computational work required to track these
individuals. Third, we only include individuals whose relationship to head
status did not change during the sample period.
Because of these criteria, we cut oﬀ ag roupo fi ndividuals who were
less than thirty in 1968. We disproportionately eliminate women from the
sample, because the PSID always classiﬁes the man of a couple as the head
of household. A single man who marries during the period remains head
of household and is included in our sample, but a single woman who mar-
ries does not maintain the same relationship to head status for the whole
period and would be excluded.
Our ﬁnal sample consists of 1,086 heads and 700 wives. It captures 66
percent of the original, non–low-income PSID sample, including 92 per-
cent of heads and 66 percent of wives. Because we did not extract data for
those who dropped out of the sample or changed their relationship to
head status, we cannot formally test whether their exclusion biases the
parameters in our wage and earnings regressions. As reﬂected in table
5A.1, however, the observable characteristics of our sample are remark-
ably similar to the original sample. We therefore believe it is unlikely that
oure conometric estimates are signiﬁcantly biased, or that our sample
selection skews the conclusions we draw about the progressivity of the
Social Security system and various reform proposals.
Log Wage Regressions and the Calculation of Potential Lifetime Income
As our analysis is intended to reﬂect a steady state, we abstract from
real economic growth that occurred during our sample period. We want
to isolate life-cycle movements in wages so that our wage proﬁles will not
be speciﬁc to one generation during a particular time frame. Adjusting for
economic growth and inﬂation yields lifetime wage proﬁles that can be
used to analyze the distributional impact of Social Security in a more gen-
eral, structural sense. We therefore adjust the nominal wage rate using
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growth in average nominal wages over the sample period. Using this index
to deﬂate wages removes the eﬀects of both inﬂation and real growth in
wages.
We want to estimate a separate wage regression for working wives and
household heads, but we question the idea of pooling the positive observa-
tionso fthe wives who work consistently throughout the sample with those
who worko nly occasionally. We found that a woman would have to work
at least 750 hours a year throughout her working life, an amount slightly
less than half time in order for own Social Security beneﬁts to be greater
than the spousal beneﬁts she could receive based on her husband’s earn-
ings (assuming she earns the same wage as her husband). Thus, we divide
the working wives into two groups based on whether or not they averaged
at least 750 hours of work per year throughout the sample. We ran our log
wage regressions separately for the two groups, and then ran another one
pooling the two groups, in order to perform an F-test. The results suggest
that these two groups should indeed be analyzed separately. We therefore
estimate three log wage regressions: for household heads, habitually work-
ing wives, and occasionally working wives.
We regress the log of the wage rate on an individual ﬁxed eﬀect and
other variables like age, age squared, and age cubed. Because we have a
ﬁxed eﬀectf or each individual, we cannot use variables that do not vary
over time (like race or gender). However, we do include age interacted with
education, race, and gender. For the heads of household, we use all posi-
tive observations of wages, which gives us 19,130 observations on our
1,086 heads. The results of this regression are shown in table 5A.2. Using
the resulting ﬁxed eﬀects and coeﬃcients, we then ﬁll in missing observa-
tions during the sample period and observations outside the sample period
so that each individual has a wage rate for every year of his entire eco-
nomic life from age twenty-two to sixty-six.
Table 5A.1 Sample Selection
Original PSID Sample Sample Used in Analysis
Number of people 2,780 1,786
Under age 30 (%) 36 25
Education of head (%)
High school diploma 33 32
College degree 12 12
Education of wife (%)
High school diploma 46 50
College degree 8 7
Race of head (%)
White 92 94
Black 7 5
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servationsa nd regress the log of the wage rate on an individual ﬁxed eﬀect
and variables for age and the interaction between age and education. The
PSID does not have a race variable for the wives in the sample. For the
wives who averaged more than 750 hours of work annually, we have 5,413
observations on 311 women. for those who work occasionally, but less
than 750 hours, we have 2,292 observations on 296 wives. The results of
the log wage regressions for the two groups of working wives can be found
in table 5A.3. For these two groups, we again use the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects
and coeﬃcients to ﬁll in missing observations within the sample and to
simulate observations outside the sample, so that each woman has a com-
plete wage proﬁle. To each of the ninety-three women who did not work
at all we assign the median ﬁxed eﬀect from the occasional workers and
then use the coeﬃcients from this group’s regression to ﬁll in an entire
proﬁle of potential hourly wages. Using the wage proﬁle for each individ-
ual, we calculate the present value of potential lifetime income. We use
this income to delineate quintiles.
The Estimation of Earnings Proﬁles
Fore ach of our ﬁve lifetimes income quintiles, we estimate three new
regressions for actual earnings of heads, habitually working wives, and
part-time working wives. Our dependent variable is actual annual earn-
ings. As above, we deﬂate earnings by the Social Security Administration’s
Average Wage Index to adjust for both inﬂation and real economic growth.
Since earnings represent a continuous variable truncated at zero, we use
at obit framework for estimation. Here we assume that earnings are the
product of optimal hours of work and a wage rate that is exogenous to the
individual. Optimal hours of work can be positive or negative, so optimal
earnings can be described as a latent variable, y*:
Table 5A.2 Log Wage Regression for Heads of Household




Age  education 0.003669 4.87
Age2  education 0.0000326 4.52
Age  female 0.0239 1.89
Age2  female 0.000306 2.11
Age  white 0.0167 1.32
Age2  white 0.000240 1.67
Individuals 1,086
N 19,130
Adjusted R 2 0.57
186 Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas Glassyiii * , =+ X βε
where X is a vector of personal characteristics that determine the individu-
al’s wage and desired hours of work. We assume that observations of zero
hours worked imply that desired hours of work are less than or equal to
zero. Actual earnings, y,a r eobserved only if y*i sg reater than zero. If y*













In the ﬁrst stage described above, in which we divide people into lifetime
income quintiles, our dependent variable was log wages. Thus we use gen-
eralized least squares estimation with individual ﬁxed eﬀects. In this sec-
ond stage, the tobit model is nonlinear. We judged that the additional pro-
gramming eﬀortt oinclude ﬁxed eﬀects in our tobit estimation was not
worth while, given that such estimation also implies inconsistent parame-
ter estimates (Heckman and MaCurdy 1980). By excluding ﬁxed eﬀects in
this stage, we are able to include race, gender, and education variables
in the earnings regressions without interacting them with age. For each
regression for the heads of household, we begin with independent variables
for age, age squared, age cubed, education, education squared, the product
of agea nd education,adummy variable for whether the head is female,
agei n teracted with the female dummy, and a dummy for whether the head
is white. We then eliminate variables that are insigniﬁcant. The results of
the regressions for heads can be found in table 5A.4. For wives who aver-
aged more than 750 hours of work a year, we begin with age, age squared,
age cubed, education, education squared and the product of age and edu-
cation.W ea gain eliminate the insigniﬁcant regressors. Results for these
regressions can be found in table 5A.5. We follow a similar procedure for
Table 5A.3 Log Wage Regressions for Wives
Independent Habitual Occasional
Variable Workers T-Statistic Workers T-Statistic
Age 0.0493 1.25 0.0104 0.102
Age2 0.000647 0.949 0.000985 0.522
Age3 0.0000018 0.399 0.0000111 1.03
Age  education 0.000252 0.106 0.00538 0.965
Age2  education 0.0000085 0.344 0.0000262 0.419
Individuals 311 296
N 5,413 2,292
Adjusted R 2 0.55 0.36

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.wives who average less than 750 hours of work per year, and these results
canb ef ound in table 5A.6.
To simulate out-of-sample observations, we multiply the independent
variables of each individual by the appropriate coeﬃcients from his or her
group’s earnings regression. In addition, we include a random component,
whichw eobtain by using the estimated standard error of each group’s
regression (shown in tables 5A.4–5A.6) to generate a normally distributed
random variable. This random component is intended to represent unfore-
seen circumstances that aﬀectea rnings. It also means that individuals with
the same observed characteristics will not have exactly the same earnings
proﬁle. Simulated earning observations are thus calculated as
ˆ ˆ ˆ , yii i =+ X βε
where  ˆ is the vector of estimated coeﬃcients from our earnings regres-
sions, and ε ˆi is the random component obtained by using the standard
error of the regression to generate a random variable. Using this proce-
dure, both positive and zero observations are generated. We found that the
number of zeros generated for each group is consistent with the number of
zero observations observed for that group during the sample years.
Derivation of Extended, Income-Diﬀerentiated Mortality
To extend the mortality tables from age eighty-ﬁve through ninety-nine,
we make three assumptions. First, we assume that the probability of re-
maining alive beyond age eighty-ﬁve decreases annually by a constant
amount (Faber and Wade 1983). Second, we set to zero the probability of
remaining alive after age ninety-nine. This age seems a reasonable cut-oﬀ
point, since less than 0.7 percent of all Social Security beneﬁciaries are
older than ninety-ﬁve (U.S. Social Security Administration 1997). Third,
given these two conditions, we ﬁnd the constant annual change in the prob-
ability each year for each sex-race group such that the resulting set of
probabilities yields the same life expectancy at age eighty-ﬁve as in the
Vital Statistics (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993).
Table7i nR ogot et al. (1992) shows information on actual deaths in the
sample for each annual income group, within each race-sex-age group. For
example, consider white males, ages twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four. For each
rangeo fincome (e.g., $10,000 to $14,999 in 1980 dollars), their table shows
the number of individuals in their sample (N  14,563), the number of
observed deaths during the sample period (O  115), and the number of
deaths that would be expected if all income groups had the same mortality
rate (E  92.2). They then divide to calculate the Observed/Expected ratio
(O/E  1.25). Actual deaths in that low-income group are 25 percent
higher than what would be expected using tables not diﬀerentiated by
income.
We know the annual income of every individual in our PSID sample, so






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.we need to exclude the “unknown income” category from the table in Ro-
got et al. (1992). If we simply ignored this category, the overall O/E ratio
would not be 1.0 for all income groups together. For this reason, we recal-
culate the expected deaths based on the subset of their individuals for
which income is known, and recalculate O/E ratios for each group. The
average of these new O/E ratios is 1.0, as desired. We then apply the appro-
priate ratio to each cell. Results for twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four-year-olds are
shown in the top half of table 5A.7.
Finally, since annual income is volatile, we do not want to apply these
annual-income-diﬀerentiated O/E ratios to the annual income of each per-
sone ach year. Instead, we base diﬀerential mortality on lifetime income,
in three steps. First, after we compute the present value of lifetime income
fore ach of the 1,786 individuals in our PSID sample, we assign each a
ranking compared to all individuals in our sample. For example, an in-
dividual whose lifetime income ranks 432 our of the 1,786 individuals is
ranked in the 24th percentile. Second, for each of the annual income
groups in table 5A.7, we likewise determine percentile rankings based on
income (shown in the third column). Third, for each individual in our
sample, we match the percentile of his or her lifetime income to the percen-
tile for the same age-race-sex category in table 5A.7. For example, a white
female aged twenty-seven who has lifetime income at the 24th percentile
would be matched to the $10,000–14,999 annual income group (which lies
between the 18th percentile and the 36th percentile). That individual
would then be assigned that group’s O/E ratiof or whitef e males (1.17).
Finally, this ratio is used to scale the probability of death for that individu-
al’s age, sex, and race in the Vital Statistics (which are not diﬀerentiated
by income).
Ar e maining problem, however, is related to causality: Our procedure
essentially uses the individual’s income as a determinant of death, even
though the annual income levels in table 5A.7 may be determined in part
by illness immediately preceding death. This problem is somewhat miti-
gated by the fact that the CPS data used by Rogot et al. (1992) is based
on total combined family income, rather than just the decedent’s income.
Calculation of Social Security Beneﬁts
Every variable in this appendix is speciﬁc to each individual, but we
drop the index i fore xpositional simplicity. For an unmarried individual,
the Social Security beneﬁt at age j is
BEN PIA CPI jj j =× 62, ,
where PIA is the primary insurance amount and CPI62,j is the cumulative
inﬂation index from age sixty-two to the age at which the beneﬁt is com-
puted. Then the mortality-adjusted beneﬁt is
192 Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas GlassEP jj j 22() , BEN BEN =×
where E22(BENj)i sthe expected value at age twenty-two of the beneﬁt to
be received at age j,a n dPj is the conditional probability of survival to age
j,g iven survival to age twenty-two. For married individuals, the basic ben-
eﬁt is computed in the same manner. We compute the spousal beneﬁt for
the wife (or analogously, the husband) as
SpBEN SBEN jj s =× 05 .,
where SpBENj is the spousal beneﬁt at wife’s age j, SBENjs is the husband’s
PIA adjusted for inﬂation to age js,a n djs is the husband’s age when the
wife is age j. Similarly, we calculate the survivor beneﬁt as
SurvBEN SBEN jj s = ,
where SurvBENj is the wife’s survivor beneﬁt after the death of the hus-
band.I fthe other spouse is alive, we assume that a married individual
receives the greater of his or her own beneﬁt (BEN) or the spousal beneﬁt
(SpBEN). If the other spouse is deceased, the individual receives the
Table 5A.7 Ratio of Observed Deaths to Expected Deaths (O/E) for Each Race-
Sex Group
O/E O/E O/E O/E
Annual Number White White Other Other
Family Income (N )P ercentile Male Female Male Female
Ages 25–34
 $5,000 11,670 6.31 1.68 1.51 1.54 1.86
$5,000–9,999 22,085 18.25 1.20 0.97 0.81 1.01
$10,000–14,999 33,331 36.27 1.28 1.17 1.36 1.01
$15,000–19,999 32,231 53.70 1.12 0.76 0.71 0.84
$20,000–24,999 30,729 70.31 0.80 0.97 0.92 0.36
$25,000–49,999 48,375 96.47 0.73 0.94 0.72 0.44
 $49,999 6,529 0.61 1.15 0.72 0.44
N 184,950 81,461 85,047 7,752 10,690
Ages 65–74
 $5,000 13,386 6.65 1.39 1.23 1.15 1.06
$5,000–9,999 20,418 49.83 1.19 1.06 0.99 1.00
$10,000–14,999 13,774 70.13 0.98 0.88 0.95 0.85
$15,000–19,999 7,082 80.57 0.75 0.93 0.79 0.91
$20,000–24,999 4,868 87.75 0.79 0.74 0.92 0.85
$25,000–49,999 6,669 97.62 0.73 0.80 0.79 0.87
 $49,999 1,614 0.59 0.79 0.79 0.87
N 67,841 27,245 34,727 2,452 3,417
Source: Rogot et al. (1992, table 7).
Note: The “expected” number of deaths is based on the overall death rate within the age-sex-
racecategory, not diﬀerentiated by income, while “observed” deaths are the actual number of
deaths in each income group.
Social Security Reform Proposals and Lifetime Progressivity 193greater of his or her own beneﬁt (BEN) or the survivor beneﬁt (SurvBEN).
Using PHj and PWj for the husband’s and wife’s survival probabilities, the
husband’s mortality-adjusted beneﬁt is




()[ ( , )
() ( , )] ,
HBEN PH PW Max BEN SpBEN
PW Max BEN SurvBEN
=
+−
where E22(HBENj)i sthe expected value at age twenty-two of the hus-
band’s beneﬁt. This expected value includes only the dollars going directly
to husband. A symmetrical calculation is made to determine the wife’s
mortality-adjusted beneﬁt:




()[ ( , )
() ( , )] .
WBEN PW PH Max BEN SpBEN
PH Max BEN SurvBEN
=
+−
We then compute the present value of expected taxes and beneﬁts at age
twenty-two for each individual, using alternative values for the constant
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Comment Stephen C. Goss
This chapter presents an analysis of the progressivity of the Social Security
Old Age, and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program across groups sepa-
rated by the level of lifetime potential earnings. The authors calculate the
net Social Security tax (the diﬀerence between the present values of taxes
paid and beneﬁts receive) under present law and under four proposals de-
signed to restore long-range solvency for OASDI. The net tax is expressed
in relative terms, as a percentage of the lifetime potential earnings for each
group, and is referred to as a net tax rate. Progressivity is deﬁned as the
state in which the net tax rate rises as lifetime potential income rises.
This chapter makes a real contribution to the analysis of progressivity
Stephen C. Goss is chief actuary of the U.S. Social Security Administration.
196 Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas Glassin Social Security, providing a potentially useful measure for assessing the
degree of progressivity across proposed formulations of Social Security.
This kind of assessment should help policy makers achieve a balanced
understanding of the implications of diﬀerent reform proposals.
This discussion reviews brieﬂy the measures of money’s worth that have
evolveda nd how these measures have provided a basis for assessing prog-
ressivity in the Social Security program. Finally, I make a number of sug-
gestions for improving the calculations using this approach and for the
speciﬁc calculations presented in this chapter.
Measures of Money’s Worth
The net tax (the negative of the “net subsidy” referred to by Steuerle
and Bakija 1994) is one of a family of “money’s worth” measures. Another,
the “money’s worth ratio,” is the ratio of the present value of expected
beneﬁts to expected taxes. Like the net tax, the money’s worth ratio re-
quires selection of a discount rate. In each case, the beneﬁts under the plan
in question are being eﬀectively compared to the beneﬁts that could have
been achieved by investing the same taxes in a deﬁned-contribution ac-
count that realized a rate of return equal to the assumed discount rate.
A third measure is the internal rate of return, i.e., the constant real rate
of return on taxes for each generation that would just allow the taxes to
payf or beneﬁts under the plan. If the internal rate of return is less than
the assumed discount rate for the other measures, then the net tax is posi-
tive and the money’s worth ratio is less than 1.0. Comprehensive estimates
using each of these three measures for a range of proposals were presented
in appendix 2 of volume 1 of the report of the 1994–96 Advisory Council
on Social Security.
All of these measures are sensitive to accurate and consistent measure-
mentofbothtaxesandbeneﬁts.Becausethesemeasurescomparethediffer-
encesb etween two large values (taxes and beneﬁts) that tend to be fairly
similar in size, even small inconsistencies can be magniﬁed into large
errors.
Measurement of Progressivity
Progressivity may be assessed in a number of ways. A plan with a de-
creasing internal rate of return (or a decreasing money’s worth ratio) as
the earnings level increases has traditionally been referred to as progres-
sive.T his kind of progressivity is observed for the current U.S. Social Secu-
rity program even though the payroll tax, taken alone, is regressive. (Earn-
ings above $72,600 are not taxed for 1999.) The regressivity of the tax is
irrelevant in this case because earnings above the taxable maximum
amount are not considered in computing beneﬁts.
Social Security Reform Proposals and Lifetime Progressivity 197Steuerle and Bakija (1994) used the net subsidy to illustrate that for the
ﬁrst several decades during which the OASDI program was maturing, the
net subsidies were greater for high earners than low earners, even though
internal rates of return and money’s worth ratios were lower for high earn-
ers. This implied a kind of regressivity of the program even though stan-
dard analysis of internal rates of return indicated otherwise. Use of the
net subsidy concept in analyzing progressivity assumes that amounts of
taxes and beneﬁts that are equal in discounted present value canb ei g-
nored. Thus, the diﬀerence between discounted beneﬁts and taxes is taken
to represent the net gain or loss (subsidy or tax).
The authors of this paper have transformed the net tax (net subsidy) to
ar elative form, the net tax rate, which is far more useful for assessing
progressivity than is the net tax itself. The authors choose to divide the
net tax by total potential lifetime earnings and categorize workers with the
same measure.
This choice has the eﬀecto fp o rtraying a program with a maximum
taxable amount as less progressive at higher earnings levels than does the
internal rate of return. If, for example, we had a program that provided a
money’s worth ratio of 0.8 for all participants, this would mean a net tax
of 20 percent of the present value of each worker’s taxes. With a 10 percent
payroll tax rate, this would then mean a net tax rate of 2 percent of taxable
earnings for all workers, indicating a program that is neither progressive
norr egressive. However, with the authors’ deﬁnition of the net tax rate, a
workerw ithalifetime earnings level that is double the taxable limit would
have a net tax rate of only 1 percent, which suggests a regressive program.
In addition, the use of potential rather than actual earnings to categorize
workers dampens the extent to which the current beneﬁt formula appears
to be progressive. Under this approach, a worker who works only twenty
yearsa nd thus beneﬁts from the weighted beneﬁt formula is categorized
as if he or she had worked at the same wage rate for all years from entry
into the workforce until retirement. This has the eﬀecto fdiluting the ten-
dency for lower beneﬁt-to-tax ratios in the class of high-lifetime-income
workers. The authors provide an illustration of the eﬀecto fu sing actual
rather than taxable earnings in the denominator of the net tax rate in ﬁgure
5.3. It is unclear whether workers were reclassiﬁed on the basis of lifetime
actual rather than potential earnings. If not, it would be useful to add a
ﬁgure with this reclassiﬁcation.
For the sake of comparison (sensitivity analysis), it would also be useful
to addag r aph showing net tax rates where the net tax is divided by actual
taxable earnings. This would isolate the tendency to show regressivity at
higher earnings levels from the inclusion of nontaxable earnings. It would
include only the tendency toward regressivity that is due to diﬀerent mor-
tality assumed by earnings class. A further graph assuming no diﬀerence
in mortality by income level would also isolate this eﬀect.
198 Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas GlassUnlike the internal rate of return and the money’s worth ratio, the au-
thors’ choice of the net tax rate (as percent of total earnings) translates
the regressivity of the tax alone into the program itself. Doing this is con-
sistent with a view that any net tax that is needed to support the program
should be assessed proportionally on total earnings, unlimited by the pro-
gram taxable maximum. Consistent with this view, however, would be an
intent to distribute any net subsidy (if the net tax is in aggregate negative)
proportionally by total rather than taxable earnings. As with measures of
money’s worth, assessment of progressivity is extremely sensitive to proper
and consistent measurement of the values of beneﬁts and taxes.
Progressivity for the Whole Program
The Social Security program is a complex and highly integrated package
of beneﬁts, so it is very diﬃcult to separate out particular beneﬁts and the
associated taxes. As discussed below, money’s worth analysis and prog-
ressivity analysis are best performed for the program as a whole. This
chapter, like most analyses of Social Security, focuses only on retirement
beneﬁts. Because workers with lower earnings have not only higher mortal-
ityb ut also higher disability incidence, focusing only on retirement bene-
ﬁtsu n derstates the overall progressivity of the Social Security program. If
analysis cannot readily be extended to include expected disability beneﬁts,
then the eﬀecto fthis omission should be described.
Measurement of Beneﬁts and Taxes
In developing a measure like the net tax rate, accurate and consistent
measurement of taxes and beneﬁts is critical. While the intention of the
authors is primarily to analyze progressivity, the absolute levels of their
estimated net tax rates provide a meaningful measure of money’s worth,
whether intentional or not. The absolute level of the net tax rates is very
sensitive to any bias in estimates of beneﬁts or taxes. For example, if bene-
ﬁtsa re understated by 10 percent, then estimates of the net tax rate will
be overstated by much more than 10 percent.
Progressivity analysis would also be aﬀected if, for example, disability
beneﬁts are excluded (as they are in this chapter and in most such analy-
ses). While workers with lower earnings tend to die younger, a regressive
inﬂuence, they also tend to become disabled more, a progressive inﬂuence.
(Note that the average primary insurance amount (PIA) for new male dis-
abled workera wardsi n1997 was 15 percent below the average PIA for
new male retired worker awards. This means the average earnings level for
disabled workers is more than 15 percent below that for retired workers.)
If expected disability beneﬁts cannot be included in the analysis, the eﬀect
of their exclusion on program progressivity should be noted.
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The authors acknowledge that in comparing OASI taxes (ultimately
10.6 percent of taxable earnings) to OASI beneﬁts simulated only for retir-
ees plus their aged spouses and aged surviving spouses, their analysis ex-
cludes about 5 percent of OASI beneﬁts that are paid from the OASI trust
fund to (young) survivors. This exclusion could be partially remedied if
the analysis was restricted to workers who survive with certainty to the
normalretirementage(NRA).Thecurrentapproachofmodelingdeathbe-
tween ages twenty-two and NRA (sixty-seven) includes the taxes paid by
workers who die prematurely, but excludes much or all of the beneﬁts asso-
ciated with such deaths. This tends to understate net tax rates but may
have little eﬀect onp r o g r e s sivity.
However, the current analysis also excludes an additional, larger cate-
gory of beneﬁts, retirement beneﬁts payable to “disability conversions.”
The Disability Insurance taxes (ultimately 1.8 percent of taxable earnings)
payo nly for disability beneﬁts until a disabled worker reaches the NRA.
At that point, the disabled worker is converted to retired worker status
and receives beneﬁts from the OASI trust fund. The cost of these beneﬁts
after disability conversion represents a form of extended disability insur-
ance, in large part, that is ﬁnanced from OASI taxes. Thus, if the analysis
is restricted to retirement beneﬁts commencing at NRA, and the expected
value of disability conversion beneﬁts is excluded, then the portion of the
OASI tax that ﬁnances this insurance should also be excluded. The total
cost of disability conversion beneﬁts is about 10 percent of OASI
retirement-beneﬁt cost, so the “premium” for this insurance is signiﬁcant
portion of this amount.
In fact, due to the complex integration of beneﬁts, the only way to assure
ac o m p r ehensive match between taxes and beneﬁts for Social Security, and
to assure comprehensive analysis of progressivity for the program, is to
include all OASDI beneﬁts and taxes. This requires modeling of young
survivor beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts, and disability conversion beneﬁts, in
addition to retirement and aged survivor beneﬁts. If this is done, then the
comparison to the total OASDI payroll tax rate is straightforward. This is
the approach used for the estimates in appendix 2 of volume 1 of the report
of the 1994–96 Advisory Council on Social Security. Where this cannot
be doneb ecause of data limitations, the eﬀects of the limitation should
be discussed.
Mortality
The authors use mortality tables from the Vital Statistics of the United
States 1989 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993). These
tables are based on “period” mortality data for experience around the year
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birth year of 1990” for their analysis. The authors cite the probabilities of
at wenty-two-year-old white male’s surviving to ages sixty-ﬁve and eighty-
ﬁve as 75.8 percent and 22.3 percent, respectively. However, projected
mortality speciﬁcally for the 1990 birth cohort used in trustees’ report
projections (see the U.S. Social Security Administration’s Actuarial Study
no. 107 [1992]) indicate probabilities of 83.2 percent and 35.9 percent for
all males. Moreover, where the authors cite that 31 percent of the popula-
tion is still alive at age eighty-ﬁve, while Actuarial Study no. 107 indicates
that this percentage is expected to be 45 percent for the cohort born in
1990. Diﬀerences of this magnitude would have very substantial eﬀects on
net tax rates and may inﬂuence progressivity.
The authors should consider using projected mortality for the 1990 birth
cohort. If the Vital Statistics life tables are used, then the description of
the hypothetical workers should be modiﬁed to indicate the use of 1990
period mortality with ultimate program beneﬁt and tax provisions for the
simulation.
Mortality by Income
The authors make a very sensible choice in assigning relative mortality
at each age based on lifetime average earnings, rather than earnings at that
age. However, because the underlying data provided by Rogot et al. (1992)
areb ased on current income rather than lifetime income, there is some
element of inconsistency. The authors do point out that the fact that the
Rogot data are family income from the Current Population Surveys (CPS)
means that the relative level at each age may not be very far oﬀ from the
relative lifetime level of earnings.
Appendix table 5A.7 provides relative mortality factors by income only
for the age group twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four. It would be useful to add these
factors for other age groups used in the analysis, most importantly for ages
sixty-ﬁve and older.
Assumed Retirement at Age Sixty-Seven
The authors assume that all workers would work until reaching their
NRA (sixty-seven) if they do not die earlier. In fact, a large proportion of
insured workers currently begin receiving beneﬁts well before reaching the
NRA. This tendency is expected to continue in the future.
Them arginal increase in PIA (the unreduced beneﬁt) for work after
beneﬁt eligibility at age sixty-two is small relative to the additional taxes
paid because of the weighting in the beneﬁt formula and the inclusion of
only the highest thirty-ﬁve years in the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
(AIME). Thus, assuming that all workers work until age sixty-seven sig-
niﬁcantly understates money’s worth and overstates the net tax. To the
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at ages ixty-seven for all workers results in a systematic underestimate of
the actual progressivity that exists in the program.
For the National Commission on Retirement Policy (NCRP; 1999) and
Moynihan (1999) plans, increases in the NRA above sixty-seven are said
to be regressive largely because the methodology assumes that the hypo-
thetical worker will always delay retirement to the NRA. If workers con-
tinuet or etire more nearly at the earliest eligibility age (sixty-two) in the
future, then increase in the NRA will be more nearly equivalent to an
across-the-board beneﬁt reduction for workers of all earnings levels. This
would have a far smaller eﬀecto np rogressivity. The chapter should point
out that most of the eﬀecto fincreasing NRA on progressivity results from
the assumption that retirement age will rise directly.
Early Retirement Reduction Factors
Note 6 in the chapter suggests that for low-paid workers who tend to
have higher mortality rates, the actuarial reduction factors are “likely to be
toog reat.” In fact, the tendency is the opposite. Higher mortality implies a
larger actuarial reduction for earlier retirement, so that universal reduction
factors are relatively more favorable for groups with higher mortality, like
men. It should be further noted, however, that disabled persons have sub-
stantially higher-than-average mortality, so that workers becoming initially
entitled to retirement beneﬁts at ages sixty-two and over have an expected
mortality that is lower than the average for the population as a whole.
Treatment of Stock Returns and Inclusion of Individual Accounts
Threeo fthe four proposals considered depend signiﬁcantly on invest-
ment in stock for the payment of future beneﬁts. The Aaron and Reis-
chauer (A&R) plan (1998) increases advance funding in the trust funds
substantially and invests a part of the Social Security trust funds in stock
and other private securities. The assumption of a higher return for stock
(7 percent real) than for government bonds (3 percent real) allows a given
tax rate to provide more beneﬁts. Thus, the assumed higher rate of return
fors t ock is automatically incorporated in the relationship between beneﬁts
and taxes under the A&R plan.
For the hypothetical, fully privatized, fully deﬁned-contribution pro-
posal (associated with Feldstein and Samwick 1998), and the individual
account portion of the NCRP plan, the authors assume that the present
values of taxes (contributions) and beneﬁts (distributions) are equal. This
implicitly assumes that the real yield on individual account investments is
equal to only 2 percent. However, assuming a 7 percent real yield for stock
anda3p e r c e n tr e a lyield for government bonds with a universal real dis-
count rate of 2 percent, the expectedp r esent value of investments in de-
ﬁned-contribution individual accounts would be greater than the amount
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against portraying this expected gain, it should not be ignored for the
deﬁned-contribution plans if it is reﬂected in the A&R plan (and the de-
ﬁned beneﬁt portions of the other plans).
For the sake of consistency, the authors should include the expected
gains from stock and bond investment in the deﬁned-contribution individ-
ual accounts. The alternative would be to leave the treatment of individual
investments alone (at an implicit 2 percent real rate of return) but to mod-
ify the beneﬁts provided under the deﬁned beneﬁt program so that they
are aﬀordablew i t ho n l ya2p e r c e n tr eturn on trust fund investments.
Changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or
Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA)
Threeo fthe plans include a provision that speciﬁes or anticipates a
change in the CPI or COLA. The authors have included the eﬀect on
beneﬁts of this change for two of the plans, Moynihan and NCRP, because
the reduction in COLA is more nearly speciﬁed, regardless of what action
the Bureau of Labor Statistics takes. The eﬀecto fthe change on beneﬁts
wasn ot reﬂected in A&R because that plan anticipates more than it speci-
ﬁes a change. the treatment of CPI/COLA change should perhaps be made
consistent (either by including for all or excluding for all) for two reasons.
First, a portion of the change in CPI anticipated by these plans has already
occurred with the implementation of geometric weighting in the CPI ear-
lier this year. Second, while A&R do not specify the COLA change, the
estimates that result in the estimated long-range solvency for the plan as-
sume that the changes will occur with certainty.
Equal Beneﬁt Cuts Under Current Law
Recognizing that the payroll tax rates provided under current law are
not suﬃcientt op rovide long-range solvency, the authors develop an alter-
native “Equal % Beneﬁt Cut” alternative. The 18.9 percent beneﬁt cut is
assumed to eliminate about one-half of the long-range shortfall. If beneﬁt
levels were gradually reduced to extend solvency of the current program
on a roughly pay-as-you-go basis, a 30 percent cut would be required for
the cohort born in 1990. For the sake of consistency with the other plans,
which all are estimated to achieve long range solvency, this equal percent
beneﬁt cut should perhaps be set at 30 percent.
Other Clariﬁcations
An umber of small issues about the speciﬁcation of the proposals to
reform Social Security might be clariﬁed before publication. For example,
the provision in the NCRP plan to include all years of earnings in the
numerator of the AIME would do so literally. This means that AIME
would no longer be a true average, but a ratio with potentially more years
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Another example is the 75 percent of couple beneﬁts for widow(er)s in
the A&R proposal. This provision is intended to provide 75 percent of the
sum the couple would be receiving if both were still alive. Thus, the lower-
earning spouse would contribute to the couple beneﬁt either his own
worker beneﬁt or one-third of the spouse’s worker beneﬁt, whichever is
higher. Accordingly, 75 percent of the couple beneﬁt could not be less than
beneﬁt provided under current law.
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Discussion Summary
Because disability and life insurance programs have diﬀerent conse-
quencesf or income redistribution, Martin Feldstein suggested that the is-
sues raised by modifying the retirement portion of the Social Security sys-
tem should be kept separate from the disability insurance program. The
decision to keep a pay-as-you-go disability system can be independent of
the proposed changes in the old age insurance program.
Charles Blahous argued that the version of the NCRP plan modeled in
this chapter diﬀers in important ways from the actual NCRP plan, making
204 Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas Glassthe results in the paper diﬃcult to interpret and possibly misleading. In
addition,h eq uestioned whether the chapter’s methodology was appro-
priate for comparing plans of diﬀerent sizes. In particular, comparing an
across-the-board cut in beneﬁts to less drastic cuts with other very progres-
sive changes should imply that the NCRP plan is more progressive than
the straight beneﬁt cut option. However, the results in the chapter seem to
suggest otherwise. In addition, Blahous noted that it is not a coincidence
that the plans assessed with the highest net Social Security tax rates have
the highest percentage of costs met through payroll taxes, because general
revenue requirements above Social Security payroll taxes are not consid-
ered. Finally, there is some inconsistent treatment between plans when
calculating net tax rates. For example, the portion of the NCRP plan with
the improved rate of return—the individual account portion—is ignored
while the remaining segment with the lower rate of return is considered.
This introduces signiﬁcant problems when comparing plans. The authors
described various changes outlined by the NCRP plan. Their explanation
for the regressive appearance of the NCRP plan compared to straight ben-
eﬁt cuts is the large reduction in the number of drop years as well as the
increase in the retirement age. According to the authors, the reduction of
drop years is the most regressive reform component that they have ana-
lyzed.
Gary Burtless did not think that redistribution to the long-lived at the
expense of the short-lived should be considered as a shortcoming of the
redistributive impact of diﬀerent plans. This redistribution is inherent
when mandatory annuitization is imposed for everyone using the same an-
nuityt able,b ut this is not fundamental to Social Security. This type of re-
distribution could be avoided by eliminating annuitization completely or
by using annuity tables that varied with life expectancy.
An umber of participants were concerned about the chapter’s approach
to modeling plans that adjust Social Security’s cost-of-living provisions.
Plans that speciﬁed that beneﬁts would be indexed at a rate below the
growth rate of the CPI were penalized, but proposals that redeﬁned the
CPI in a way that would likely reduce its growth rate were not penalized.
Since the two approaches would produce the same decrease in beneﬁts,
they should produce equivalent results.
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